Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-87-170 2 September 1987

CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Beglov on 'Double Zero,' Pershings *[Beglov in London MORNING STAR 26 Aug]* 1
Bogachev Views Pershing Statement 1
PRAVDA Discusses Kohl Statement *[1 Sep]* 2

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Bessmertnykh Meets Press 1 Sep 4
Sees Missile 'Compromise' 4
Discusses U.S. Inspection 4
Kohl Remark 'Lacks Clarity' 4
Condemns Reagan Remarks 5
Views Shultz-Shevardnadze 5
Eyes Afghan 'Solution' 6
Gerasimov on Kohl Arms Statement *[IZVESTIYA 29 Aug]* 6
Gerasimov Meets Press in PPR 6
Eyes Iran-Iraq Conflict 6
West 'Not Ready' for Talks 7
'International Observers Roundtable' *[Demchenko, Shishkin, Zholkver]* 7

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Merchant Marines Rescue U.S. Yachtsmen 12
TASS Reports on Test Experiment 12
U.S. Delegates Present 12
To Promote Test Ban Treaty 12
TV on U.S. Position on Missile Agreement 13
U.S. Congressmen End Visit in Georgia 14
Correction: Shishlin on Chautauqua 14

China

Group Meets USSR-PRC Society Leaders 14
Visits Tatar Republic 15
Mulatov on Soviet-Chinese Relations 15

Northeast Asia

Japan 'Destroyed' KAL Evidence 15
Japan Said To Falsify War History *[Biryukov]* 16
Controls on Japanese Exports Announced 16
DPRK Seeks Responses To Peace Initiative 17

Southeast Asia & Pacific

SRV Scores ASEAN Stand on Cambodia 17

Near East & South Asia

Rafsanjani Accepts Invitation to Visit *[Tehran]* 17
TV Carries Libyan Envoy on National Day 17

Sub-Saharan Africa

Report on Guinea-Bissau Delegation Visit *[IZVESTIYA 29 Aug]* 18

East Europe

Savinkin-Led Group Visits PPR *[PRAVDA 30 Aug]* 19
Mueckenberger Visits Electronics Center *[East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 29-30 Aug]* 19
Birthday Greetings to Honecker 19
Collection of Tito Speeches Published *[PRAVDA 19 Aug]* 20

West Europe

Mathias Rust Trial Opens in Moscow 2 Sep 20
TASS Preview 20
TV Film Planned *[DPA]* 21
Proceedings Begin 21
Some Correspondents Barred *[DPA]* 21
Reporter Cites 'Provocation' 21
Rust Pleads Guilty *[DPA]* 22

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political & Social

Gorbachev May 1986 Speech Summarized
[VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA INOSTRANNYKH DEL SSSR No 1] 23
Shevardnadze: Foreign Ministry Restructuring
[VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA INOSTRANNYKH DEL SSSR No 1] 25
Moscow Protest Rules Published 31
Red Square Demonstrations Banned *[AFP]* 32
BBC Report on Vilnius Protest Rejected 32
Preventative Measures for Aids Instituted 32
Narkevich Discusses Anti-AIDS Measures *[TRUD 27 Aug]* 33
TANJUG Highlights Magazine GLASNOST 34
Literary Press Editors Hold Conference *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 2 Sep]* 34
Yeltsin Opens Moscow Pedagogical Conference 35
Ligachev, Yeltsin Attend Moscow Opera *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 27 Aug]* 35
Dobrynin, Lukyanov Attend Pioneers' Jamboree 35
Dolgikh Attends Meeting Marking Miner's Day 35
BRIEFS 35
Ambassador to Luxembourg 35
Supreme Soviet Bestows Awards 36
Tajik Radio German Broadcasts 36

Economic

Shiryayev Interviewed on Reforms 36
Disposal of Firm Assets Predicted *[KYODO]* 37

Agricultural

Farms Fulfill Grain Delivery Plans *[PRAVDA UKRAINY]* 37
Kiev Oblast *[26 Aug]* 37
Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast *[27 Aug]* 38
Ternopol Oblast *[27 Aug]* 38
Lvov Oblast *[27 Aug]* 38
Volyn Oblast *[28 Aug]* 38
Zhitomir Oblast *[28 Aug]* 38
Rovno Oblast *[29 Aug]* 39
Grain Harvest Successes Reported *[PRAVDA 30 Aug]* 39

Beglov on 'Double Zero,' Pershings
PM271045 London MORNING STAR in English 26 Aug 87 p 4

[NOVOSTI political commentator Spartak Beglov article: "US Says Zero Plus 72 Equals Zero"]

[Text] Will the progress of the Geneva talks be a central point during conversations between Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz when they meet in Washington next month?

The answer to this question is not hard to guess, especially as many problems are likely to remain unresolved by the time they meet. Their discussions will thus hold the key to a new Soviet-US summit.

President Reagan's latest statement on the elimination of two classes of Soviet and US nuclear weapons was, to my mind, over-optimistic.

He can be understood however. Mikhail Gorbachev's global "double-zero" initiative was welcomed throughout the world, so, having a political axe to grind, President Reagan found it expedient to stamp his own personal brand on the new effort.

What is disturbing, however, is the arrogance with which Washington intimates that all US-related problems have been removed at the negotiations. I suspect that the statements from the US are made doubly optimistic to make the Soviet Union responsible for likely public disappointments in the future.

The point is that the U.S. position is still riddled with mysteries hard to unravel not only for the partner in the talks but even for the rest of the world.

Why is the US in Geneva sticking fast to 72 nuclear warheads for West German Pershing-1As, which they do not want to include in an agreement?

I heard this question put by Soviet and foreign journalists to each other at the Moscow Press Centre recently. None gave a sensible answer.

On top of other lame arguments the US diplomats have now advanced a version that the Soviet Union came out against the nuclear warheads at the last moment and with some ulterior motives.

This is simply not true. I visited Geneva last April when the present decisive stage in the talks was only just beginning.

I have these words jotted down in my notes from the deputy head of the Soviet delegation: "Lastly about the 72 nuclear warheads for Pershing-1As. We believe that they are to be reduced and destroyed as well. Our position is natural and logical, which is also recognised in NATO circles.

"A negotiated zero for medium-range nuclear systems and shorter-range missiles in Europe must be a complete zero, with no exceptions."

Washington's attempt to present as non-negotiable the weapons of a "third country" violates at least three things: the rules of arithmetics — zero plus 72 does not make zero; logic — if the warheads are US property they cannot be an integral part of a third country's system; and, lastly, international law, because the US and West Germany may be accused of violating the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (Articles 1 and 2).

There is one more question: Pershing-1As, it is claimed, are getting obsolete and they will be phased out by the time medium-range missiles are to be withdrawn — five years from now under the contemplated agreement.

This version is being circulated behind the scenes. However, a White House official spokesman recently stressed something different: that the US preserve the modernisation right to this missile.

It has also been revealed that under US-West German cooperation conditions Bonn can purchase the modified version — Pershing-1B. Let us remember this detail.

We have here all the ingredients of a political game with all the roles cast between Washington and Bonn.

By its intractable stance the US is pushing the Soviet Union to act in kind: to pass on to its allies the shorter-range missiles deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, while retaining Soviet control over their nuclear warheads.

Such a scenario, if proved real, would appear to give Washington the "legitimate" option to deploy nuclear-tipped Pershing-1Bs.

But what about the "double zero?" After all, it presupposes abolition of both shorter-range and medium-range missiles.

US speculation on the need to protect West German interests in case of a possible agreement deliberately ignores the many battlefield nuclear weapons — more than 4,600 — which NATO will keep even following the agreement.

It is an odd way of preparing for a new round of relations with the GDR and other Eastern countries by compensating for planned agreements with new systems of nuclear weapons.

The search for answers to these riddles or rather to a problem with many unknown quantities would have been unnecessary had Washington clearly stated its full commitment to "double zero" at the Geneva talks, with no exceptions.

Both zeros would therefore be equally binding on each side, with no loopholes left.

Bogachev Views Pershing Statement
LD272224 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 27 Aug 87

[Text] [Presenter Konstantin Pastyuk] Yesterday, as you have already heard comrade listeners, the FRG chancellor announced at a routine press conference in Bonn that in

the event of an agreement being concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, and the problem of ratification of the relevant treaty being solved, the West German Pershing-1A missiles could be withdrawn without being replaced by modernized systems. How is one to assess this statement by the FRG leader? I'll ask TASS Military Observer Vladimir Ivanovich Bogachev, whom we have invited to the studio today, to answer this question:

[Bogachev] Kohl's statement draws attention, first and foremost, to the fact that it talks only about the possiblity of abolishing these systems. His words—the FRG could withdraw the missiles—are not a pledge by the FRG to remove the systems. I would like to believe that in this case Bonn is not seeking to create a loophole to renege on its stance. In past arms control talks, the NATO countries have repeatedly gone back on pledges that were even more precisely worded. The broad interpretation by the United States of the treaty restricting antimissile defense systems, an interpretation that utterly distorts the idea behind the 1972 Soviet-U.S. agreement, is a shining example of the irresponsible approach by the NATO countries to positions already agreed. Certain conditions the chancellor is stipulating toward possibly resolving the problems pertaining to operational-tactical missiles also put one on one's guard. Helmut Kohl stressed, specifically, that Bonn will only act to resolve the problem of the FRG's operational-tactical missiles after the final abolition of all the USSR and the United States medium-range and operational-tactical missiles.

[Patsyuk] Until quite recently, Western politicans were continually accusing the Soviet Union of demanding the elimination of the weapons of a third country — the West German missiles — at the talks on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. To what extent were these accusations just?

[Bogachev] As is known, the FRG has 72 Pershing-1A operational-tactical missiles. The nuclear warheads for these missiles are deployed on FRG territory, but they belong to the United States. I must say, Konstantin Nikolayevich, that despite statements by officials in Bonn and Washington, the Soviet side has never demanded the elimination of the West German Pershing-1A missiles at the talks. The Soviet draft agreement talks only about eliminating the U.S. nuclear warheads for these missiles.

[Patsyuk] How is one to explain these attempts by the United States to distort the stance of the Soviet Union at the talks?

[Bogachev] The U.S. side is evidently trying to create a pretext to put the U.S. nuclear warheads outside the scope of the accord. Without any grounds whatsoever, it has stubbornly asserted that the Soviet side is allegedly linking in one package demands for the destruction of the West German missiles and the elimination of the U.S. nuclear warheads for them. The USSR, I repeat, has never demanded the elimination of the West German Pershing-1A missiles. The significance of the FRG chancellor's statement, if it is really motivated by sincere concern for the progress of the Geneva talks, is that Bonn will not object to the destruction of the U.S. nuclear warheads for the West German Pershings. However, it must be said that broad circles of the FRG public, including the Social Democratic Party of West Germany, have indeed been insisting and are insisting on the elimination of the West German missiles. Withdrawing the West German Pershing-1A's, if it is done, is a response to the demands of a majority of the FRG population. This kind of step, of course, is only to be welcomed.

[Patsyuk] In his statement on the nuclear missile complex, FRG Chancellor Kohl laid particular stress on the problem of monitoring the observance of a future agreement on medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles. In what way are the sides in Geneva now raising the question of verification?

[Bogachev] Washington has simply got into a muddle with its proposals at the Geneva talks on verifying the observance of the agreement. Several days ago the U.S. Administration issued instructions to its delegation in Geneva to withdraw previous U.S. demands for strict on-site inspection [proverka na mestakh]. This happened after the Soviet delegation had accepted the idea of on-site inspection at any time, in any place, in the event of a suspected breaking of the treaty. It turned out that the Soviet Union was prepared to agree to much further reaching monitoring measures than the United States. It now turns out that the White House initially submitted a proposal for universal verification only because it counted upon the Soviet Union refusing to accept it. One U.S. figure expressed the view that the U.S. Administration's retreat from its former demands has given the Soviet Union a moral superiority. Yet another U.S. myth about the closed nature of Soviet society and the USSR's refusal to agree to reciprocal on-site inspection crashed.

PRAVDA Discusses Kohl Statement

PM011257 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Sep 87 Second Edition p 5

[Ye. Grigoryev "International Notes": "Bonn and Geneva"]

[Text] A few days ago the head of the FRG Government made a statement that caused animated responses, not by chance. It is well known that the problem of the 72 nuclear warheads belonging to the United States and kept in the FRG for the same number of operational-tactical Pershing-1A missiles the Bundeswehr possesses, has become a serious obstacle in the Geneva talks. Chancellor G. Kohl mainly focused attention precisely on this problem. In his words, Bonn "will do everything in its power" to help achieve success in the Soviet-U.S. talks on medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles. The announcement that in certain conditions the Pershing-1A missiles can be "not modernized but eliminated" was a sensation.

It is apparent that the proposal of such a prospect is a new feature in the FRG Government's approach to the extraordinarily critical and ticklish problem. Up to this

point, this potential was regarded by Bonn as an inviolable "sacred cow." This is still the stance taken by the Christian Social Union and also by certain circles in the Christian Democratic Union forming the "steel helmet" faction. So to a certain degree the chancellor has "shown character," and at the same time the domestic policy potential of formulas different from those derived from the old thinking.

It is a positive phenomenon whenever a responsible leader announces the possibility of eliminating dangerous military potential. Or, as they say in diplomatic language, "a step in the right direction." In the chancellor's statement, in my view, there is one more essential feature that for some reason many Western commentators are overlooking. To be precise — the demand for talks on "short-range nuclear systems in Europe," that is continuing the process of eliminating nuclear weapons on our continent. Thus, from the political and "theoretical" viewpoint, Mr Kohl's statement really deserves every bit of attention. And study, as a USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman noted a few days ago.

Let us see what the chancellor's statement looks like from the practical standpoint. When does he envision the elimination of the Pershing-1A's? On what conditions and in what circumstances?

They are determined in the statement by four "ifs:" if the USSR and the United States reach an agreement on the elimination of the corresponding missiles on a global scale; if questions of verification are solved to suit "all the sides concerned;" if the agreement is ratified and comes into force; if in accordance with it there will actually be an elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. As we see, Bonn is not in a hurry. With this "schedule" — which, incidentally, still lacks any guarantee except the chancellor's verbal statement — U.S. nuclear warheads for the West German operational-tactical missiles would still hang over Europe for a long time.

Another aspect: Mr Kohl expressed the wish to "help the success of the talks." A significant part of the Western press claims that "the chancellor's decision removes the last serious obstacle in the way of concluding an agreement." But the chancellor also said the following: "As for West German Pershing-1A missile systems with their nuclear warheads, the right of command and control [pravo rasporyazhatsya] of which belongs exclusively to the United States, they were never a topic in the Geneva talks and cannot become so." Quite similar to the same old story.

But perhaps the declared possibility of eliminating the Pershing-1A's in combination with the statement of a wish to "help the U.S. President" in Geneva is nonetheless a hint that Washington now has the right to freely determine the fate of its warheads? FRG Foreign Minister Mr Genscher optimistically suggested that "in the event of these missiles being decommissioned, there will be no reason to keep these nuclear warheads in the FRG." But the White House, while supporting the "statement on the future fate of the Pershing-1A missiles" talked about by the Federal chancellor and all four "conditions for rejecting modernization," is as silent as the grave on the main subject of concern in Geneva — the U.S. nuclear warheads.

Thus, as it seems to me, the Bonn sensation still leaves several questions. They have not escaped the public's attention.

"Kohl's decision," the London weekly *The News on Sunday* reflects, "can be regarded as a belated but important step on the way to concluding a Soviet-U.S. agreement on the elimination of all medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. Or should it be assessed as a cunning game being played by President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl? Thank goodness this is not so. But doubts still remain. The West German missiles must be eliminated by 1991. But all possible countermeasures can be taken during this time, including the rejection (of the decision itself) on the part of the powerful U.S. military-industrial complex. Soviet leader M. Gorbachev really wants this agreement. He has shown this by a whole series of recent initiatives. But does the U.S. Government really want this?"

In the opinion of the Bonn bulletin *Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst*, "the long list of conditions' in Kohl's statement leaves loopholes making it possible to take back at some point the refusal to modernize or site the next generation of systems instead. . . All these 'ifs' and 'buts' cannot conceal the feeling that what we have here is a cunning propagandist maneuver designed to alleviate the dissatisfaction of the West German population and the whole of Europe, do a favor for friend Ron, and push aside the CSU [Christian Social Union] but at the same time use this entire problem to ensure freedom of political decisions. The character of the Pershing-1A missiles will partially remain as a trump card essential for obtaining new concessions, since the missiles in any case will remain till 1991 or 1992."

The prospect of the elimination of the Pershing-1A's accords with the mood of the West German public. This is confirmed, in particular, by the results of a poll in connection with H. Kohl's statement. In the FRG there is a growing number of voices demanding that this prospect be backed up by a binding agreement by the government and the Bundestag. From the international standpoint, after this statement the discussions around Geneva have become appreciably livelier. It is being opined that it will have a "positive influence on progress in the Geneva talks."

The future will show whether this is correct. But the FRG Government's practical policy on this most crucial question, when there is a need not in words but in deeds to eliminate the obstacle obvious to all in Geneva, will be the main touchstone. With goodwill Bonn can make an essential contribution to this work, especially since broad public circles in the FRG itself are demanding this.

Bessmertnykh Meets Press 1 Sep

Sees Missile 'Compromise'

LD011516 Moscow TASS in English 1503 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS — "On the way towards reaching an accord on global elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, apart from the issue of the West German "Pershing-1A" missiles and the U.S. warheads for them, there exist other obstacles, those of the second order, so to say".

"In particular, to ensure verification is such a problem", Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, said at a briefing at the ministry's press centre.

"The Soviet side considers it necessary to work out and introduce a strict rational verification which would give full confidence that weapons will be really reduced and eliminated".

"The closer we began to approach the elaboration of wording of individual articles of a treaty, the more marked became the U.S. side's departure from the earlier-made statements on the need for strict and large-scale verification".

"Besides, part of U.S. proposals envisage certain advantages for the U.S. side. For example, the Americans suggest that the medium- and shorter-range missiles' deployment area subject to verification on Soviet territory be, so to say, transparent to U.S. inspectors. At the same time such opportunities would be sharply limited to Soviet inspectors. They would have an opportunity to verify only individual facilities, and not the entire area of the missiles deployment".

"The U.S. side insists that the Soviet Union begin to eliminate missiles while the Americans would wait for a long time, verifying the Soviet Union's actions".

"We hold that a compromise version is possible here: The two sides within an agreed period, that of one year, maybe, will render all medium-range missiles operationally unsuitable by separating the nuclear warheads from them. Thereby the two sides would find themselves in an equal position".

"At the talks, there are also a number of technical difficulties," Aleksandr Bessmertnykh emphasized. "However, all of them are resolvable: only time and a desire to reach agreement are needed for that".

Discusses U.S. Inspection

LD011500 Moscow TASS in English 1413 GMT 1 Sep 87

["The Soviet Union Complying With the Stockholm Accords" — TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS — Answering questions asked by reporters during today's briefing at the press center of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, a deputy minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R., cited a concrete example of the Soviet Union's compliance with the accords on confidence-building measures reached at the Stockholm conference.

Late on August 26, he went on to say, the United States turned to us in Washington and Moscow simultaneously with the request to carry out an inspection of an exercise held in Belorussia at that time. In less than 24 hours the Soviet side examined the request and agreed to the inspection. The case in point is the first such experiment, Bessmertnykh said, but I believe that in the future it will become an established practice for all the parties to the accords.

Both the study of the Americans' request and the exercise of the inspection itself fully complied with the multilateral documents signed in Stockholm. On the political plane, from the standpoint of promoting confidence in Europe, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh emphasized, the experiment was positive.

As to the results of the inspection, the deputy foreign minister said, the Stockholm accords demand that the side conducting an inspection should shortly submit a report on the job done to all the states, parties to the accord, naturally enough, including the Soviet Union.

Kohl Remark 'Lacks Clarity'

LD011355 Moscow TASS in English 1336 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS — We regard the statement by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl concerning the "Pershing-1A" missiles as not a simple and in a definite measure useful step that could really make it easier for Americans, if they wish so, to solve the issue of a full zero for short-range missiles, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, deputy foreign minister of the USSR, told a briefing today.

The statement by the head of the West German Government bluntly points out that the nuclear warheads for the "Pershing-1A" missiles are controlled exclusively by the United States. A conclusion can be reached from this that the issue of the warheads is subject to solution at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva.

Besides, the chancellor laid down a programme for eliminating the missiles themselves which are controlled by West Germany. We have already stated that the issue of the delivery vehicles, that is of the "Pershing-1A" missiles without the warheads, was not the topic of the Soviet-U.S. talks. Therefore, the way the FRG is going to deal with them is Bonn's affair. Nonetheless, one can welcome in principle West Germany's stated stance that these delivery vehicles will not be modernized, but destroyed in some time.

From our point of view, the chancellor's statement lacks clarity on the key issue of the further destiny of the U.S. nuclear warheads for the 72 West German short-range missiles.

Some additional light on the FRG's stand is shed by a statement made by Vice Chancellor Hans-Dietrich Genscher that there will be no reasons any longer for the presence of the U.S. warheads in the FRG when the missiles are taken out of service. So, the FRG's refusal to modernize its shorter-range missiles deprives the United States of any reason to keep its warheads in the FRG.

At the same time I would like to point out the vice chancellor's second important statement that the Pershing-1A missiles will not be replaced by other ones.

We take note of this because the FRG is announcing its renunciation of any intentions to replace its missiles by other ones, i.e. by its own missiles or by those developed by third countries, and with the participation of third countries other than the United States.

Still Mr Kohl's statement, even in conjunction with Mr Genscher's one, retains an element of ambiguity as to how the issue of the U.S. warheads will be tackled now. What can be the consequences of that?

Firstly, to those who do not want the conclusion of an accord between the Soviet Union and the United States on complete elimination on medium- and shorter-range missiles, there emerges quite an opportunity to make use of the statements by the West German leaders to evade such a solution and to pretend that the issue of the U.S. warheads for Pershing-1A missiles is removed from the agenda.

Secondly, the lack of clarity in Bonn's stand can be made use of in attempts to shelve the issue by taking a solution to it outside a Soviet-U.S. treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles, the treaty which is being worked out now.

I should say definitely that, following the statement made by the chancellor of the FRG, the state of affairs at the talks in Geneva did not change for the better notwithstanding the serious efforts being made by the Soviet delegation to get things moving.

The U.S. delegation continues to evade the discussion of the issue on full zero for shorter-range missiles. Moreover, despite Bonn's renunciation of plans to modernize Pershing-1A missiles, the Americans have not officially changed their stand so far on the right to produce Pershing-1B which would become a modernization of the FRG's existing shorter-range missiles.

One would not like to think that over the 48 hours when, as Mr Kohl said, the leaders of the United States and the FRG coordinated the text of the chancellor's statement, a strategy was being worked out to frustrate an accord to this effect between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The peoples are setting quite great hopes on the possibility of using the historic chance: To agree at last on the physical elimination of two classes of nuclear arms. Bonn and Washington, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh emphasized, should give a clear-cut answer to the question of whether they really want to help achieve an accord that would be reliable, guaranteed and legally binding. If this is so, West Germany should clarify its stand, and the U.S. Government should remove the main obstacle to an accord, i.e. to agree to a genuinely global 'zero option' not only for medium-range missiles but also for shorter-range missiles of the USSR and the United States.

Condemns Reagan Remarks

LD011329 Moscow TASS in English 1312 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS — The recent speech by President Ronald Reagan in Los Angeles and his radio address can put into doubt the U.S. Administration's assurances about its readiness to build up and improve Soviet-American relations, said Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh. He replied to questions by journalists during a brefing held here today.

"These statements," he went on to say, "strike a discord note with the President's pronouncements that Washington is ready to use the emerging historic chance in the sphere of the understanding with the Soviet Union."

Many things in such statements, A. Bessmertnykh went on to say, do not suit us: the cocky tone which is clearly unsuitable for relations between the two great powers, the content of some parts of the speeches, which are far from the truth and, in some cases, affect the sense of dignity of Soviet people. We have to state on the whole that such statements by U.S. leaders reflect utter ignorance of the sources of the Soviet system, the Soviet policy, misunderstanding of our way of thinking and felings. Those who wrote these speeches for the President, did him disservice.

Our attention was drawn to these statements also due to the fact that it has become an established practice that when preparation starts for serious meetings or serious opportunities emerge to improve relations, campaigns are launched to aggravate and to whip up the situation, to decrease opportunities for an onward movement, regrettably, it looks like this time that the chief executive of the U.S. state has headed the campaign.

We would like to hope that Washington realizes the fact that such actions will not do a good service to Soviet-American relations and can bring about negative consequences, pointed out A. Bessmertnykh.

Views Shultz-Shevardnadze

LD011346 Moscow TASS in English 1329 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS — "As always security questions definitely will take up the lion's share of the forthcoming talks between the USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and the U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz", Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said today.

At a briefing here today he was asked about the possible agenda of this meeting.

"One can suppose that the most serious attention of the ministers will be attracted by questions connected with the attainment of an accord on medium-range and shorter-range missiles. Not because these missiles are more important than the other missiles in the arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States but because agreement on them can now be reached easier and quicker. This requires the removal of a number of obstacles", the USSR deputy foreign minister said further.

"But the Soviet side finds it necessary to discuss also other questions which influence the international situation, not to speak of our mutual relations with the United States. Regional problems will be discussed, in any case we are ready for this. The subject matter connected with the state of bilateral relations, with the implementation of the already existing agreements between our countries.[sentence as received] The Soviet side also intends to raise the question of the human rights situation in the United States. And of course it is ready to discuss it on a mutual basis", Aleksandr Bessmertnykh stressed.

"The Soviet side is preparing for the discussion seriously and profoundly. We proceed from the premise that these talks, as it has happened in the past as well, offer a possibility not only of advancing along the road of normalising relations between the Soviet Union and the United States but also of understanding better each other's positions on cardinal problems of our time", Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said.

Eyes Afghan 'Solution'

LD011527 Moscow TASS in English 1406 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS — "A solution to the problem of settling the Afghanistan situation requires increasingly intensive efforts", Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, stated at a briefing here today. "The Soviet Union supports Afghanistan's proposal that a new round of the talks in Geneva be held earlier than planned". "The talks", Aleksandr Bessmertnykh went on to say, "are connected with external circumstances of the Afghan situation. The talks should lead to creating appropriate foundations which would guarantee the security of Afghanistan, its future status, and impossibility of any aggressive actions or outside interference against it".

"We hold that in Afghanistan itself substantial and serious positive changes are taking place in that which concerns the establishment of a basis for solving the issue: how the country will be governed in the future".

"So, a combination of two tendencies — internal and external — should result in the removal of the Afghan issue from the agenda of international life".

"We would like conditions, which could become the result of the talks under the auspices of the U.N. undersecretary-general, to enable us to determine our position concerning a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan", Aleksandr Bessmertnykh emphasized. "It is known that there exists a decision in principle to this effect".

Gerasimov on Kohl Arms Statement

PM281743 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Aug 87 Morning Edition p 4

[A. Kuvshinnikov report on press conference given by G. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration: "At a Delicate Point. From Our Correspondent at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] We, G. Gerasimov emphasized, greeted with interest FRG Chancellor H. Kohl's statement regarding the fate of the West German Pershing-1A missiles. It is being carefully studied. Asked by a correspondent of *Koelnischer Stadt-Anzeiger* whether H. Kohl's statement has in any way changed the Soviet assessment of the situation surrounding the Geneva talks, the Soviet spokesman remarked: "Of course, the situation has changed after H. Kohl's statement for the better. Although we are holding talks with the United States, West Germany could have made a gesture toward us [zhest navstrechu]. To some extent this gesture has been made, although I want to caution that we are still studying the conditions hedging Kohl's proposal."

However, it should be clearly understood that the FRG chancellor's proposed elimination of the missiles — whose fate per se does not interest us, incidentally — in no way means the automatic elimination of their 72 nuclear warheads stored at U.S. dumps, an elimination which is necessary for implementation of the accords on "global double zero." It is simply that nothing now even formally prevents the United States from precisely and clearly stating its agreement to destroy these 72 warheads. But as long as it has not done this — and it has not done so thus far — the road to an agreement remains blocked. [passage omitted]

Gerasimov Meets Press in PPR

Eyes Iran-Iraq Conflict

LD011522 Moscow TASS in English 1519 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Warsaw September 1 TASS — Alarming reports started coming from the Iran-Iraq front after a relative lull of six weeks again. This fact cannot but cause a feeling of concern and regret in us, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a press conference here today. On the one hand, there emerged a real threat that the implementation of Resolution 598 of the United Nations Security Council will be disrupted, on the other hand, a new escalation of combat operations might be used by the United States and its allies for justification for the build up of their military presence in the area, and in future for direct interference in the events in the area.

The Soviet Union is convinced that a responsible, well-considered approach and constructive cooperation to eliminate that most dangerous seat of tension is required of all states without exception in the present explosive atmosphere, Gennadiy Gerasimov said. It is not to be allowed that a collectively worked out and unanimously adopted Resolution 598 of the Security Council be discarded. A diplomacy of persistent efforts aimed at ending the conflict should be continued.

West 'Not Ready' for Talks

LD011811 Moscow TASS in English 1745 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Warsaw September 1 TASS — "Up to now Western countries have not given a reply to the Soviet proposal, put forward about a year ago, to hold an international conference in Moscow on humanitarian issues", Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at a press conference here today in answer to a question put by a TASS correspondent.

"This initiative is known to have been proposed by Eduard Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, at the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe."

"The stand of Western countries brings about quite an unusual situation", Gennadiy Gerasimov pointed out. "They seemingly are very much fond of speaking of human rights and of reproaching the Soviet Union for ignoring them, and when we propose to discuss this directly in Moscow they are in two minds up to now about whether they should say 'yes' and arrive in Moscow".

"They try to furnish their possible consent with various kinds of preconditions of the following type: Will it be possible for your dissidents to arrive? And so on. On the whole, they do not give their consent".

"Such a strange, at first glance, stand indicates that in this field the West is hypocritical to a considerable extent. I think that Western countries would feel uncomfortable at such a conference which would discuss the entire range of humanitarian aspects of human rights, and not only people's right to leave some country. Therefore we consider that at present they are just not ready for such a conference."

'International Observers Roundtable'

LD301946 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 30 Aug 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Pavel Yepifanovich Demchenko, member of the editorial board of PRAVDA; Gennadiy Arkadiyevich Shishkin, first deputy general director of TASS; and Aleksandr Vladimiroivch Zholkver, political observer of Central Television and All-Union Radio]

[Text] [Zholkver] Hello, comrades. Last week was marked by an important event in international life: the Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development at last got underway at UN Headquarters in New York. I say at last because the conference was to have been held last summer in Paris, which proved impossible for various reasons. In any event, it opened in New York on Monday, and there are emissaries from some 150 countries taking part. Many countries are represented by their foreign ministers or deputy foreign ministers. The Soviet delegation is led by Comrade Petrovskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs.

But here's the paradox: One great power is stubbornly boycotting this important forum even though it is being held on its territory. I refer to the United States. How would you explain that paradox, Gennadiy Arkadiyevich?

[Shishkin] Washington has refused to take part in the conference under the pretext that it sees no connection between disarmament and development. That blindness is not fortuitous. The United States is deliberately shutting its eyes to the obvious fact that there is a casual connection between the trillion dollars owed by the developing countries and the increase of more than a trillion in U.S. military expenditure over the last decades. You only have to ponder this one small isolated fact: The annual debt repayments of Brazil alone would suffice to finance two progams such as SDI on its present scale. Ths situation in which two-thirds of the world's population are hopelessly in debt while a small group of states plays the part of omnipotent usurers not only radically contradicts the need for international economic security, but also entails the risk of serious sociopolitical upheavals.

[Demchenko] Yes, and I'd like to add here . . .

[Zholkver, interrupting] Yes, go ahead, Pavel Yepifanovich.

[Demchenko] ...that at the conference, our delegation has forwarded a proposal to set up a special disarmament for development fund. In other words, the money saved after a reduction of armaments — after a real reduction of armaments — could be paid into such a fund to be used to fill the horrifying gap that has now formed beween the developed and the developing countries. We now have the situation that a surplus of money, a concentration of bank capital in some countries, is combined with a horrifying lack of money for elementary development in the developing countries.

[Zholkver] Pavel Yepifanovich, this superabundance of money in some countries that you mentioned is, of course, relative. You said rightly that it is certain banks that have this huge surplus. But even when it comes to the very rich capitalist states, even there, there is no surplus for social needs. Let us take, for example, the United States. I have seen figures provided by the U.S. economists themselves showing that to develop the infrastructure in the United States, they consider they need $400 billion, while the U.S. balance of payments deficit last year exceeded $200 billion. The national debt is more than $2 trillion. So really, even these rich countries actually have no surplus either.

This is not only true of the United States. I have just seen an interesting report that for several days now there has been picketting of 10 Downing Street, the residence of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The picketers are the homeless. In England, good old England, there are now 130,000 homeless people, and there is no money to build relatively cheap housing. Rich West Germany has the same problem. The Greens have just held a special press conference on the subject. They say that in the FRG there are officially 100,000 homeless and another 200,000 living wretchedly in huts and trailers. Again, the reason is a lack of money.

But of course you are quite right, Pavel Yepifanovich, that the problem is especially acute in the so-called Third World countries. But don't you think that, along with this problem of unequal trade and debt, an important factor is also that Third World countries are themselves spending quite a lot on the production and, especially, the purchase of arms? I am thinking for instance of the Iran-Iraq war, the seventh anniversary of which is now upon us. There too, in that fratricidal, bloody conflict, the most enormous sums of money are being spent.

[Demchenko] Yes, you are absolutely right, of course, huge sums. The Iran-Iraq conflict is at present one of the largest regional conflicts on earth. In number of casualties, losses, and the amount of material damage inflicted on those states, it exceeds anything that has happened since Vietnam — since the U.S. aggression against Vietnam, that is. The United States has used this war — for them, it is a justification. A U.S. fleet appeared at the approaches to the Gulf back in 1977, then in 1979 it was reinforced, and now, under the pretext of this war it is being increased. According to today's figures, there are almost 60 foreign warships in the Gulf or near the entrance to it.

[Shishkin] Of which more than 40 are American.

[Zholkver] But a question arises here that Gennadiy Arkadiyevich, as an expert on U.S. affairs, can perhaps answer. The Americans say their extensive and active presence in the region, which they figure is now costing them $2 million a day, is based on the need to ensure supplies of oil from that region to the United States. Well, I have seen figures suggesting that the United States gets only 6 percent of their oil from there.

[Shishkin] You are quite right, Aleksandr Vladimirovich. They get 6 percent; other countries get far more, say, Western Europe—25 percent.

[Zholkver] Japan even more.

[Shishkin] Japan even more—80 percent. So it is hardly likely the United States is concerned about ensuring their own supplies. It is even less likely that they are zealously guarding the interests of their allies.

[Zholkver] And competitors, such as Japan.

[Shishkin] And competitors, yes. I think they are so recklessly involving themselves in this adventure because they are not dependent on oil from this region. In other words, if something happens there and oil supplies cease as a result of a military catastrophe, it is not the United States who will suffer, but, as you said, their friends and competitors: Western Europe and Japan.

[Zholkver] What you are saying, in other words, is that in this way, they are keeping their NATO allies on the leash.

[Shishkin] Absolutely, absolutely! The allies are horrified by their antics in that region because the more they saturate it with their warships, the greater the chance of all kinds of military accidents. They have started escorting Kuwaiti tankers, and a tanker they were escorting has been blown up, and the escorting U.S. naval ships have begun hiding behind the tanker so as not to be blown up themselves.

[Zholkver] Yes, and the Americans themselves see these dangers. I saw an article in the latest issue of *USA Today* that notes the presence of this mighty U.S. armada in the Gulf is making the threat of war very real. Interestingly enough, we constantly compare this armada to the U.S. armada in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin off Vietnam, and *USA Today* does the same, observing that in Vietnam, too, the U.S. presence was at first small but rapidly grew large, and the end of it all was lost lives and squandered dollars.

Well, it seems to me, Gennadiy Arkadiyevich, that it is very true that the United States is dragging its allies into this. The latest reports are that not only the Netherlands—and before that France and Britain — but also Italy, for instance, is going to send ships. But don't you think there is a double game being played here? A game in two directions? On the one hand, regarding the United States' relations with its allies and competitors, and on the other with the two states that are at war, both Iran and Iraq. I am thinking, on the one hand, of the secret deliveries of U.S. arms to Iran, which were the subject of the investigations into the Irangate scandal in the United States, and, at the same time, here is another report: that this very week, a U.S.-Iraqi trade agreement has been signed. True, a State Department spokesman has claimed that the signing of the agreement does not change U.S. policy, which is, as he put it, that: We don't supply military equipment to either of the parties to the conflict. But in view of Irangate, what do you think, Pavel Yepifanovich? Couldn't there be a few underwater mines here as well, to use naval terminology?

[Demchenko] The underwater mines are there, alright. There are many of them, and your observation is absolutely accurate: The main task of the United States is, indeed, to preserve U.S. domination of that region. In other words, they are addressing themselves to the strategic task that was set for them back in the days of President Carter. Yes, the Americans are now playing a double game, perhaps even a triple game, and there may in fact be many layers. Here are a few examples. The Americans - as Irangate has shown, and the U.S. press

had exposed even earlier — are flirting with certain elements of the Iranian leadership with the aim of winning them over to the U.S. side for the restoration of U.S. positions in Iran. Iran borders on the Soviet Union and is an advantageous bridgehead for the Pentagon. As you know, they have not succeeded in this. Threats against Iran alternate with promises of arms deliveries. Currently, there is every indication that Israel is continuing to supply arms and in large quantities.

[Zholkver] U.S. arms.

[Demchenko] Including U.S. arms. Without the consent of the United States, that would not be possible. There, again, there is clearly a double game going on. But at the same time it is clear that the United States has begun to improve its relations with Iraq.

Well, in general terms I don't think we should object to this: Normal relations and normal trade must exist in all regions.

But I want to come back to the Iran-Iraq war, to complete my train of thought, which is that this cruel and, indeed, senseless war must be stopped. The Security Council has now passed a special resolution, and moreover, for the first time, the five permanent members of the Security Council have voted to stop this war and bring the warring sides to the conference table. After that it would be easier to carry out the Soviet proposal that all foreign vessels should be withdrawn from the Gulf and freedom of shipping ensured on all international routes, that is, in the Indian Ocean and further, on the oil routes.

[Zholkver] Pavel Yepifanovich, you have already mentioned that U.S. policy in this region is not unique just to the Persian Gulf, in fact. It is part of the U.S. policy of neoglobalism, the expression of which is to be found in the Truman Doctrine. Do you not think, Gennadiy Arkadiyevich, that the same policy with, perhaps, a certain modification of the means used so far is being quite obviously conducted in another region of the globe. I have in mind Latin America.

[Demchenko] There is no doubt about this whatsoever. This is again confirmed by the incident that ocurred on 27 August. On that day the President, despite being on holiday, was distracted from his favorite occupation of chopping wood and riding to receive the Nicaraguan contras. The question arises: Why does the President have to interrupt his holiday to receive some sort of renegades who have been thrown out by the Nicaraguan people and who are in fact, politically bankrupt — a fact that is recognized all over the world, including the United States? There is a very simple clue to this riddle: In Central America events have recently taken place that show that in this region too shoots of new thinking are appearing. I have in mind the well-known meeting of five Central American states, which have come to an accord among themselves about a peaceful plan for settling the situation in Central America.

[Zholkver] Do you mean the meeting in Guatemala?

[Demchenko] Yes, of course. This is precisely the meeting that I have in mind. The fact is, that the United States had made all attempts possible to prevent this meeting from being held in the first place. But since these attempts failed, it tried to foil this meeting. But all these plans have failed. These are the circumstances that forced Reagan to make the most of a bad situation. He was forced — having no other alternative — to agree in words to this joint plan. Although he has agreed to it in words, he has retained his anti-Nicaraguan stance.

[Zholkver] U.S. politicians themselves recognize this, incidentally. Levine, a member of the House of Representatives, for example, gave a press conference — incidentally in the very hotel where Reagan met the contras — and stated that the President's public statements about his striving for peace in Central America and his assurances of his continuing support for the contras are in full contradiction.

You know, it seems to me that another speech of the President is also just as contradictory. I have in mind his speech in Los Angeles, where it had been beforehand widely advertised that this speech would contain fundamental assessments of East-West and USSR-U.S. relations, and of the ways of solving disarmament problems. But since this speech was made, everyone has been noting that, first, the speech failed to meet expectations as far as proposals on disarmament are concerned. The speech does not contain any new proposals. As to U.S.-USSR relations, this speech is pervaded by the traditions of old political thinking to such an extent, that, frankly speaking, it has thrown even some U.S. observers into confusion.

[Demchenko] Well, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, I would divide Reagan's speech into two sections. The first part, as you mentioned, is the anti-Soviet part. Here he adopts the pose of a mentor and begins to teach us what democracy is, what it should be like, how the Supreme Soviet should operate, what it should discuss, what laws it should adopt . . .

[Shishkin, interrupting] And all this . . .

[Zholkver, interrupting] And all this after the Irangate scandal.

[Demchenko] This is precisely it. This is precisely it. All this is so preposterous, so antediluvian and so out of keeping with modern reality that I would ignore this part of his speech. The more so since, I think, those political observers are right who regard this as, so to speak, his tribute to his extreme right-wing and reactionary friends, his entourage, who, while gritting their teeth, do not wish to accept the Soviet Union under any cirucmstances and do not want any agreements with the Soviet Union whatsoever.

Then there is the second section of his speech, in which he talks about prospects for attaining an agreement with the Soviet Union on medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles. Here he allows an optimistic note

to creep in. Still, what is the political meaning of this speech? I think this: Cornered by the peace offensive of the Soviet Union and by the clear logic of the stance of our country and our leadership, and at the same time crushed by the trouble caused by the Iran-contras affair, President Reagan was looking for an opportunity for a long time to show himself as a strong leader. Above all he was aspiring to take over the initiative from the hands of the Soviet Union and to make it look as if the ball is now, as it were, in the court of the Soviet Union, regarding disarmament problems. It is natural, then, that the statement of FRG Chancellor Kohl on the Pershing-1A missiles and the U.S. statement about the fact that they are introducing new proposals on arms control issues — all this coincided and was obviously synchronized with Reagan's speech.

But of course, there can be no question whatsoever of the U.S. President taking over the initiative in matters of disarmament, although the U.S. press has at present started whipping up optimism by promising that the attaining of an agreement is imminent and calculating that a summit meeting will be held some time in November and that this agreement will be signed at it. I would not share this optimism and here is the reason why: Indeed, much has already been done and achieved on the way toward an agreement in Geneva. Indeed, Kohl's statement on the Pershing-1A missiles is to some extent a step forward in comparison with the previous rigid stand in which the Pershings became on obstacle in the way of concluding an agreement.

[Zholkver] I would say that it is a shift from that position, from their former position.

[Shishkin] Yes, yes.

[Zholkver] Although West German journalists themselves are noting that there are at least four buts, or four ifs.

[Shishkin] Four. Precisely so. But we cannot take all this in isolation. Look how events have unfolded since Reykjavik. In Reykjavik, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Reagan reached accord in effect about what? About the elimination of medum-range missiles with the exception of 100 warheads that were to remain with us in the Asian part of our territory. Then there was accord on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons; and third, all of this was conditional on a strengthening of the provisions of the antimissile defense treaty. It was here that Reykjavik got stuck since Reagan categorically refused to agree to this, and there was no agreement.

How did the United States and its NATO allies behave after that? They said: There you are, a package was reached in Reykjavik, it all foundered on the Strategic Defense Initiative; if the Soviet Union is really concerned about disarmament, let it untie that package. They calculated that the Soviet Union would not do it, and so they shouted above it very boldly. But the Soviet Union took hold of the package and untied it and agreed to discuss the question of medium-range missiles and conclude a separate agreement on them. Then new demands were raised: Oh, it's not enough just to deal with the medium-range missiles in Europe; the 100 warheads remaining in Asia are hindering and complicating the verification [kontrol] and making the conclusion of an agreement difficult altogether. Here too the Soviet Union moved toward the position of the West.

What else? That's all, you'd think. Nothing of the sort. The United States and the West as a whole dragged out the following obstacle: The Soviet Union, apart from medium-range missiles, has operational-tactical missiles — it doesn't matter what kills us, medium-range missiles or those. Let's reach a decision about them, they said, reckoning the Soviet Union, which has those missiles while the United States does not have them, would be the only one to eliminate those missiles. But here again, the famous poker players — the Americans consider themselves to be experts at poker, whereas the Russians are chess players, they think everything through, while we can bluff it out, so it goes, and crush them with our strength — and here these famous players miscalculated and lost because the Soviet Union agreed to this as well.

What next? Next we have the favorite, customary, traditional hobbyhorse — verification [kontrol]. We do not trust the Soviet Union. Until the Soviet Union lets us go everywhere, wherever we like, wherever we ask to be able to check [poverit], in case they hide their missiles in the forests — and, as we know, the Soviet Union has dense forests with bears — until then there will be no agreement. But suddenly the Soviet Union here too said: We favor the strictest verification [kontrol]; we ourselves have an interest in this first and foremost. Here there was a misfire: The U.S. side, which had so loudly been shouting about verification [kontrol], about verifiers [kontrolery] coming without any warning, and so forth, backed off and said no, no, no, we don't want that sort of strict verification [kontrol] now, and we don't want verifiers [kontrollery] to come and check [poveryali]; we can get by with conventional methods of checking [poverski]. What does all this signify? It signifies that every time, as soon as we are near to reaching an agreement, more and more new reservations and conditions are sought out: As you said, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, Kohl too has four conditions.

[Zholkver] But still, it must be said — and this was emphasized in the message from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the participants of the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development with which we started our conversation; it is emphasized in this message that there now exist real opportunities to conclude an agreement on eliminating two classes of nuclear weaponry, operational-tactical and medium range missiles, and on a substantial reduction of strategic weapons on condition that there is a strengthening of the provisions of the antimissile defense treaty. It seems to me that this is especially important today, now. After all, our broadcast is going on the air on the eve of a date that evokes extremely profound reflections

in everyone, especially people of our generation. I mean 1 September — the anniversary of the beginning of World War II in 1939. It is specially important now, on the threshold of that date, to recall also the lessons of the last war and to take measures not to allow a new war.

[Demchenko] World War II cost maybe more than 50 million lives.

[Shishkin] Yes, yes. I can give precise figures: in World War II there were 72 states taking part. It cost 55 million lives, including 20 million of our Soviet citizens.

[Demchenko] A colossal number. Since then, that is, since the great victory, 42 years have passed. I must say that a huge service to freeing Europe of wars all that time — it is evidently the longest period in the history of Europe without wars — a great service to this is the policy of our country, a great service by the policy of the socialist community and those great efforts our party and our state, and our people, of course, have exerted to consolidate peace, and not only in Europe, but in the world as a whole.

[Zholkver] I should like to conclude our conversation perhaps with a statement that it is for the young people to build and further develop this new, better, and more just world. I feel it is truly symbolic that last week there was an all-union Pioneer rally at Artek, and greeting the participants in that rally, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev called on them to strengthen internationalist ties, to strengthen ties with their foreign coevals, feeling themselves to be parts of an enormous single world, and there is no happier and better way, he stressed, than the way of fighting for a new, just world for man and in the name of man. Thank you for taking part in this broadcast, colleagues. Thank you for listening.

United States & Canada

Merchant Marines Rescue U.S. Yachtsmen

LD011707 Moscow TASS in English 1702 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] New York September 1 TASS — TASS correspondent Andrey Chytov reports:

Two Americans whose sailboat capsized eight miles from the shore in the northern part of Lake Michigan were rescued Monday evening by seamen of the Soviet merchant marine. The yachtsmen in distress Stephen Rudolph and James McCullough were taken aboard the Soviet vessel *Zapolyarny and given the necessary aid.*

A ship of the U.S. Coast Guard approached Zapolyarny, took the Americans aboard and carried them and their sailboat to Charlevoix, Michigan state.

TASS Reports on Test Experiment

U.S. Delegates Present

LD012102 Moscow TASS in English 2048 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Karaganda September 1 TASS — Virtually all low-yield nuclear explosions can be registered with the help of modern seismic equipment at considerable distances. Scientists taking part in the Soviet-American experiment to verify refraining from nuclear explosions decided to demonstrate that to a group of U.S. congressmen and figures from America's Natural Resources Defense Council. The group led by Rep. Thomas Downey arrived in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. Today the delegation accompanied by Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov, a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., vice-president of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, arrived in Karaganda, Kazakhstan.

One year has passed since the beginning of the experiment. Non-stop recording devices have been producing seismograms at three Soviet-American seismic stations. Industrial blasts in strip mines where development work is going on leave their imprint on them. Moreover, a truck passing nearby is also recorded, as are the steps of a researcher approaching the well where sensors are installed at a depth of 100 meters.

Looking at the seismogram one can also see "autographs" which imperil all whispers and sounds of this planet — these are distant echoes of nuclear explosions.

Igor Nersesov, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of Armenia, manager of the experiment from the Soviet side, told a TASS correspondent which tasks the scientists were working to cope with.

"The point of departure for the experiment was the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing instituted by the Soviet Union August 6, 1985," the Soviet researcher recalled. "The Soviet Government permitted the installation of three Soviet-American seismic stations in the area of the city of Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan. Under the terms of the agreement it was planned to carry out similar work in the area of the Nevada test range.

"Our task was to furnish physical proof that no nuclear tests are being conducted. The agreement signed, a group of American colleagues arrived here. We determined three points at a distance from industrial installations which could cause interference.

"Since the American side expressed mistrust it was decided to install American-made seismic equipment. The first seismogram was obtained July 11, 1986 and it recorded silence at the Soviet nuclear test range.

"The very first months of the equipment's work conclusively demonstrated that it did not meet the formulated tasks in full. These were seismic stations designed to study processes taking place in the earth's crust and in epicenters of major earthquakes. This is why the construction of another station began in parallel for installing more sophisticated equipment ordered in the United States, capable of recording very weak signals. To compare the data Soviet-manufactured stations were installed at the same points," Igor Nersesov went on to say.

"Unfortunately, the terms of the agreement were not meet in full. The American side did not give us a chance to carry out the same work in the United States, in the area of the Nevada test range. Rock formations in Kazakhstan and Nevada differ considerably in geological structure and this fact affects the velocity of signal propagation," the Soviet researcher emphasized.

"The task of the scientists involved in the project is to determine characteristics of the attenuation of seismic signals in conditions existing here and there. In other words, the task is to translate conductivity indicators into the language of mathematics. This task is being solved successfully. However, things would move much faster if Soviet researchers conducted similar studies in Nevada," Igor Nersesov said.

"It is equally important to 'teach' our equipment to distinguish between an earthquake and a nuclear explosion and to register the difference between natural and artificial seismic phenomena," the researcher said.

"A seismic control network to detect nuclear explosions makes it possible to register them at considerable distances," Igor Nersesov maintains. "And the installation of a seismic station near test ranges completely solves the problem of monitoring nuclear explosions. Thus, scientists give politicians a dependable instrument for checking the situation at nuclear test ranges."

To Promote Test Ban Treaty

LD021043 Moscow TASS in English 0949 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Karaganda September 2 TASS — Research workers of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Nation Resources Defence Council of the United States intend

to prove scientifically that even insignificant underground explosions respond to seismic control.

This would pave the way for concluding a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

The scientists will detonate today and tomorrow three so-called chemical low-yield explosions which will be registered by Soviet-American seismic stations placed around the Soviet nuclear test site in the Semipalatinsk area.

Three American Congressmen Thomas Downey, Robert Carr and James Moody who arrived in Karaganda at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Soviet and foreign journalists will watch the experiments.

The yield of the scheduled blasts will range from 10 to 20 tons. Soviet- and American-made instruments will register them from the distances of 250 and 630 kilometres. The congressmen and the journalists will be told about the operation of these instruments.

In the opinion of Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the experiment was of special significance in connection with the forthcoming hearings at the House of Representatives of U.S. Congress on a draft law banning the allocation of funds for nuclear blasts with a yield exceeding one kiloton.

If that draft was adopted, the Soviet Union would also limit the yield of its nuclear tests down to one kiloton, as the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, recently said.

"This would become a major step towards the total prohibition of nuclear testing," Academician Velikhov pointed out.

TV on U.S. Position on Missile Agreement

LD301959 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 30 Aug 87

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Tomas Kolesnichenko]

[Text] Hello comrades! There remains 1 day until the beginning of calendar fall. A sort of interval is coming to an end in the international arena. Discussions are becoming animated in the lobbies and foyers, forecasts are being drawn up, the next diplomatic moves are being prepared — in brief, work is being started. And the tone in recent days has to alarge extent been set by the proposals contained in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's address to those taking part in the International Conference on Disarmament and Development.

The contemporary situation in the world is so serious that specific and, moreover, immediate actions are required. Mere words and general arguments — all the more so if they contradict the logic of new thinking — are insufficient. This has been stressed on more than one occasion by our country, but unfortunately it was just such a tenor that governed the speech by President Reagan last week, who interrupted his holiday at his California ranch in Santa Barbara to deliver a speech in Los Angeles specially devoted to relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. I do not even speak of the historical digression made by the President on the period from the Yalta conference to the present day, from which it follows that over the last 40 years the United States has been adamently fighting for peace, democracy and human rights, while we have supposedly just been throwing spanners in the works for them. You will say that it's primitive and old hat — of course; but this is how the American President deals with history, and not only with history.

Moving on to the contemporary situation in the world, the President stressed that there have now come about opportunities to improve the international climate, and that they must not be missed. His words are without doubt correct, if we take for example the projected agreement for the total elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles — medium-range and operational-tactical. It was Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev who stressed the other day that this agreement could be signed even tomorrow if the United States and the FRG remove the well-known obstacles. And what happens? Reagan repeats once again that the whole delay is the fault of the Soviet Union, which, supposedly, had at the last moment made a demand regarding the West German Pershing-1A missiles. And yet both Reagan and those who were listening to him know very well that it is not a matter of the missiles themselves which are in the hands of the FRG, but the 72 nuclear warheads that belong to the United States. How can 2 zeros equal 72? Not a single mathematician has yet been able to explain this, let alone a politician. Nor has this been explained by Chancellor Kohl of the FRG who made a statement the other day which was hastily declared to be sensational by the right wing press. Kohl did indeed say that, as he wants to help Reagan bring the Geneva talks to a successful conclusion, under certain conditions the Pershing-1A missiles would not be modernized but destroyed. But under what conditions, and when? And this is where the ifs begin. One if, a second, a third — in all there are four of them. That is, there are enough of them to drown the very possibility of an agreement, gain several years, and during all of these years hang on to the U.S. warheads.

It seems to me that both Reagan's speech and Kohl's statement are not coincidental: Both in the United States and in the FRG the struggle surrounding the main issue has become unusually acute — is it at all necessary to embark on an agreement with the Soviet Union? Couldn't it just be put off for an indefinite period? How is this to be explained? In the United States the situation is not simple in the administration itself. In the first place, it lacks unity on this issue internally — a total dissonance. Furthermore, it has undermined its authority to an extreme extent in the Iran-Contras scandal, and for this reason has become a convenient target for pressure from the far right. They will now assess any concession at the missile talks as a manifestation of a certain weakness on the part of the administration. And

the President tries to show how tough and uncompromising he is. On the other side of Reagan his entourage understands that the public won't forgive them if they miss the historic chance and fail to make use of the Soviet proposals which are meeting with a broad welcome throughout the world, and also within the United States. This also accounts for the illogical position of the president — let us be blunt — his quite clumsy maneuvers.

And the situation in the FRG, too, is very complex. The opposition — the Social Democrats, the Greens, and others — and broad public circles believe that the FRG must not, has no right, to become an obstacle on the road to eliminating missiles in Europe. For this reason there have indeed been new nuances in Kohl's position. It will be interesting to see how this develops — debates are to begin soon in the Bundestag. And the right wing is not laying down its arms, and are trying in their turn to influence the solution of the missiles issue. And incidentally, not only this issue; they are striving to influence the political climate in the country overall.

U.S. Congressmen End Visit in Georgia

LD011623 Moscow TASS in English 1558 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Tbilisi September 1 TASS — A delegation of the Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives of U.S. Congress led by its chairman Claude Pepper has ended its visit to the Soviet Union with a trip to Georgia, a Soviet Transcaucasian republic.

They had a conversation at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the republic in the course of which the sides discussed in an open and friendly atmosphere questions connected with Soviet-American relations. Pavel Gilashvili, president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia, emphasized that a political atmosphere in the world depended a great deal on the relations between the two countries bound by special responsibility for the destinies of the planet. With this in view the turning down of the course towards confrontation in favour of a new political thinking acquires paramount importance. It was pointed out that the deepening of a Soviet-American dialogue on nuclear disarmament problems was an urgent necessity.

Members of the delegation saw the sights of Tbilisi which is about 1,500 years old and met with well-known Georgian gerentologists.

Sharing their impressions of the trip about the country, U.S. congressmen specially pointed out kindness and hospitality with which they were met everywhere, the frankness of conversations they had and a profound interest in the development and deepening of a Soviet-American dialogue for the sake of the consolidation of world peace.

The delegation left the USSR today. It visited this country at the invitation of the Soviet parliamentary group.

Correction: Shishlin on Chautauqua

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Third Chautauqua Conference Convenes" and subheaded "Shishlin Comments on Talk," published in the 28 August Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 9, paragraph five, line one:

[Video shows N.V. Shishlin, identified by screen caption as senior official of the CPSU Central Committee, at conference](changing editorial note to include title identification)

China

Group Meets USSR-PRC Society Leaders

OW011331 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 1 Sep 87

[From the "Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society" program]

[Excerpts] The delegation of the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the NPC, headed by Yu Wen, member of the NPC Standing Committee and deputy chairman of the commission, has been visiting our country for the past 2 weeks. [passage omitted]

On 28 August the Chinese delegation met leaders of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society at the House for Friendship with people of Foreign Countries in Moscow. Present on the occasion were (Shileizov), deputy chairman the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; Academician Tikhvinskiy, chairman of the Central Council of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society; and deputy chairmen and members of the council.

Academician Tikhvinskiy delivered an address of welcome to the members of the Chinese NPC delegation. He said: Members of the Central Council of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society and (Shileizov), deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Union of the Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, are gathered to here to welcome the visiting Chinese NPC delegation. We are greatly honored to receive such a high-level delegation. Academician Tikhvinskiy then briefed the delegation members on the activities of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society. [passage omitted]

Yu Wen, Head of the NPC Delegation, spoke at the meeting:

[Begin recording] This visit to the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society during our stay in the Soviet Union is a significant event. The foundation of friendship between the Chinese and Soviet people can be termed profound; the friendly relations between the people of two nations are based on history. [passage omitted]

Our delegation has been warmly received by Soviets at all levels and by the Soviet people. We have gained a better understanding of the situation and of the experience in nationalities work in the USSR. We will be able

to use your experience for reference. Both of our countries are carrying out reforms of our economic and political structures. These reforms are unprecedented in history, and there is no experience that we can use for reference. All we can do is to explore and advance in the course of practice. This requries us to constantly exchange work experience in order to avoid detours. We believe that this visit by our delegation has been fruitful; we had to pay this call on you because we want to develop the friendly relations between civic organizations of the two nations. [end recording]

Visits Tatar Republic

LD271963 Moscow TASS in English 1617 GMT 27 Aug 87

[Text] Kazan August 27 TASS — A delegation of the Nationalities Committee of the National People's Congress, headed by Yu Wen, a member of the Standing Committee of the Congress and vice-chairman of the Nationalities Committee, has been in Soviet Tatar Republic for three days.

The delegation had a talk at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on the successes in the restructuring effort under way in the country, the role of the soviets of people's deputies in implementing the decisions of the 27th congress of the Soviet Communist Party, on the development of Tatar national culture and arts.

The delegation's head noted that the aim of the visit was to study the tremendous experience of development of the Soviet Union's multination republics, of consolidating friendship among peoples. It was with a special feeling that we arrived in the city where Lenin began his revolutionary activity, he added.

The delegation laid flowers at the monument to V.I. Lenin in the city's Freedom Square and at the monument to heroes who fell in battles for Soviet Power.

It also visited the local Lenin museum and the Lenin Memorial of Kazan University.

Mulatov on Soviet-Chinese Relations

OW301235 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0300 GMT 29 Aug 87

[Mulatov commentary]

[Text] In an interview with a TASS foreign affairs reporter, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev answered important question on Soviet-Chinese relations. Soviet-Chinese relations are advancing toward complete normalization. Rogachev said: This is one of the most important orientations of CPSU and Soviet government policy. He emphatically pointed out that the establishment of solid goodneighborly cooperation between the two biggest socialist countries is conducive to ensuring stability and security of the Asian-Pacific region and the whole world. In a commentary, station observer Mulatov points out that the more solid Soviet-Chinese cooperation becomes, the more benefit it will bring to the cause of peace of both the Soviet and Chinese people and to the socialist forces. This was true in the past; it is also true today.

The Soviet people are very pleased with the fact that the general orientation in the domestic and foreign policies of our two socialist nations is identical or almost identical. Both the Soviet Union and China are engaged in a peaceful economic construction program on a grand scale. Both nations regard that proving the superiority of the socialist social system over the capitalist social system is a matter of primary importance. The Soviet and the Chinese people understand that because of the economic reform being carried out in our two countries under the leadership of the CPSU and the CPC in recent years, the mutual bond between our two countries has further strengthened. Mutual visits by social and professional delegations and by personages of scientific and cultural circles have become a common occurrence. Each contact between our two countries expands the field of mutual understanding between our two people and two countries and contributes to the discovery of more and more possibilities in bilateral cooperation. In solving fundamental issues in international affairs, the Soviet Union and China increasingly share each other's views.

The current international conference on disarmament and development being held at the UN Headquarters in New York is another new evidence in this regard. Our two countries both have the firm conviction that the conference fully reflects the strong desire of the people of various nations for peace and social development. Both the Soviet and Chinese press have sharply criticize Washington's stand of boycotting the conference on international disarmament and development. Safeguarding peace, preventing a nuclear war, and striving for peace are main objectives in both Soviet and Chinese foreign policies. This forms the basis for the two countries to coordinate their actions on the world stage.

Northeast Asia

Japan 'Destroyed' KAL Evidence

LD020820 Moscow TASS in English 0702 GMT 2 Sep 87

["Japanese Authorities Destroy Evidence of Boeing-747 Flight" — TASS headline]

[Text]Tokyo September 2 TASS — TASS correspondent Vasiliy Golovnin reports:

The Japanese authorities destroyed evidence related to the flight of the South Korean liner "Boeing-747" which in the early hours of September 1, 1983 strayed deep into the USSR's airspace, says a statement by the committee investigating this incident, which was today handed to the TASS bureau in Tokyo.

The committee comprises deputies of parliament from a number of opposition parties, representatives of the public and the families of the South Korean "Boeing" passengers who died during this abortive spy operation.

According to the available information, many objects from this aircraft, which were picked up by the Japanese authorities from sea following the incident or received from the Soviet side, have been burnt or thrown out lately, the statement points out. Members of the committee believe that a thorough study of this evidence could shed light on many circumstances of the spy flight, which are deliberately not disclosed by Tokyo.

The committee has in possession, in part, information that at least three radar stations of the Japanese Armed Forces secretly tracked the "Boeing"'s movement in the airspace of the USSR on September 1, 1983. The Nakasone government refuses, however, until today under the pretext of "keeping state secrets" to provide this information even to the deputies of parliament.

In conjunction with this, the committee protested to the Japanese Cabinet of ministers and demanded that it make public all materials related to the operation involving the South Korean aircraft.

Japan Said To Falsify War History
LD011735 Moscow TASS in English 1713 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS — TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov writes:

55 Million people perished between September 1, 1939 when Hitler Germany launched the most horrible war, and September 2, 1945 when representatives of militarist Japan signed the act of unconditional surrender which signified the end to the world war. These dates are imprinted in the memory of people. They should not be forgotten. Lessons should be drawn so that the tragedy should not be repeated.

Japanese officials do not like to recall September 2. The anniversary of the end of the war is marked in Japan on August 15, the day the emperor accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration that contained the demand for unconditional surrender. That day is observed in Japan in a peculiar way: Not by mourning millions of victims of Japanese aggression in countries of the Asia-Pacific region, not by condemning the clique of militarists who plunged the Japanese people into the bloodbath, but by paying homage to those "who gave their lives for their country", to those whose souls became "deities" in the Yasukuni Temple. They include the guiltiest war criminals, among them former Prime Minister Hideki Tojio on whose order Japan made a treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour, thus starting the war in the Pacific. And those criminals who cannot be pardoned are worshipped by members of the Japanese cabinet, by the prime minister himself.

"We should never forget the fact that 20 million people were killed in Asian countries as a result of Japan's aggression in the years of the second world war", said Japanese historian Shigenori Nishikawa. "We wish the Japanese at last to realise that their country was not a victim of aggression. It was an aggressor that invaded other countries", said that prominent public figure, one of the initiators of the creation of the National Peace Council of the families of the victims of war. And the Japanese cabinet erases from school text-books any mention of Japan's aggression and territorial seizures, of the occupiers' atrocities. At the bid of the authorities the bloodbath in Nankin is presented in those text-books as all but an act of "self-defence", and the annexation of Korea as almost granting the appropriate request of that country, and so on and so forth.

For what purpose is this done? It is done so that it should be simpler to conduct the present military policy, which is carrying Japan in the direction opposite to peace, goodneighbourliness, cooperation. If this is not so then why build up large armed forces which is prohibited by Japan's Constitution? Why should the ruling circles disregard the legislation under which the country's military expenditures were limited by one per cent of the gross national product? Why discard the parliamentary resolution on using outer space in peaceful purposes exclusively, why abrogate the ban on the export of military technology, why ignore the three non-nuclear principles? Is it not the striving to justify all this military activity that is behind the attempts of official Tokyo to intimidate Japanese people with the non-existent "Soviet military menace"?.

When one considers these facts in their totality, it becomes clear why definite Japanese circles make insistent calls for revising the results of the past war and the post-war arrangement in the Far East. And such winged words suggest themselves: "Whom God wishes to destroy, he first makes mad".

Controls on Japanese Exports Announced
LD011136 Moscow TASS in English 1051 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Tokyo September 1 TASS — Japanese-U.S. intergovernmental talks on the Japanese Government's measures to step up control over exports to socialist countries ended here today.

Japanese representatives announced a tougher law on control over foreign currency dealings and foreign trade, with amendements expected to be finally endorsed by the parliament on September 7. However, the American side described the measures adopted by Japan as ineffective and demanded, in particular, a sharp rise in the number of inspectors to control compliance with the discriminatory provisions of the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, COCOM, in trade between Japanese firms and socialist countries.

The participants in the talks agreed to continue talks between Japan and the USA at working level on the question of observing by Tokyo of COCOM demands. A group of American experts is expected to arrive on the Japanese islands in mid-September to work out concrete "recommendations" to the Japanese Government on how it should use COCOM articles.

Under Washington's pressure Tokyo is contemplating additional steps aimed at erecting new barriers within the COCOM framework in trade with socialist countries. At the same time Japanese official circles express discontentment over crude pressure on the part of the American side on Japanese companies. Hajime Tamura, minister of international trade and industry, said, commenting on the plans of the American Congress to include in the proposed trade bill a provision banning imports of Toshiba products to the USA, that no third country could be allowed to use sanctions against Japanese companies.

DPRK Seeks Responses To Peace Initiative

LD281324 Moscow TASS in English 1119 GMT 28 Aug 87

[Text] Pyongyang August 28 TASS — A statement by a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) was released here today. It calls upon Washington and the Seoul Administrations to respond without delay to the Republic's recent peace initiative for holding talks aimed at easing tension in the Korean peninsula.

Since the issue of reducing armaments in that part of the globe is directly linked with U.S. military presence in South Korea, U.S. state secretary should take part in the talks on this issue along with North-South foreign ministers, the document emphasizes.

The DPRK launched a proposal for holding a preliminary meeting with a view to organizing talks in Panmunjom on September 23.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

SRV Scores ASEAN Stand on Cambodia

LD281353 Moscow TASS in English 1439 GMT 28 Aug 87

[Text] Hanoi August 28 TASS — Vietnam's Foreign Ministry today issued a statement, coordinated with the foreign ministries in Kampuchea and Laos, criticizing the ASEAN countries' stand at the recent unofficial meeting in Bangkok.

It was agreed during the Indonesian foreign minister's visit to Vietnam to hold an informal meeting between two Kampuchean sides, the statement said.

"The meeting is to be held on the basis of equality, without any preconditions and politic l tags. In the future, other parties concerned, including Vietnam, could join in."

World public opinion viewed that agreement is a first step opening up prospects for the solution of regional problems, including the Kampuchean problem.

Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea immediately expressed their readiness to do everything possible to implement the agreement.

The ASEAN countries, however, in fact attempted to revise it drastically at the Bangkok meeting.

Their statement clearly revealed the aspiration to replace the dialogue between the two Kampuchean sides by a dialogue between Kampuchean sides and Vietnam and impose obviously unacceptable eight-point proposals advanced by "Democratic Kampuchea" as a precondition.

This interpretation of the agreement was a serious obstacle in the way of the search for a political settlement in Southeast Asia and the process of turning the region into a zone of peace and stability.

If the ASEAN countries were seriously seeking the continuation of the dialogue and political settlement, they should firmly stick to the letter and spirit of the accords reached, the statement said. In turn, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea were prepared to cooperate with all ASEAN countries in that direction.

Near East & South Asia

Rafsanjani Accepts Invitation to Visit

LD311708 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 31 Aug 87

[Text] USSR Ambassador Boldyrev was received today by Majlis speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani. During the meeting the Soviet ambassador conveyed greetings and messages from Soviet leaders to the Majlis speaker. Written invitations from messers (Pilkonov) and (Virosuv), spokesmen for the Supreme Soviet and Supreme Assembly of Nations [titles of bodies as heard] inviting the Majlis speaker and a parliamentary delegation to visit the USSR this October, were handed to Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Hashemi-Rafsanjani accepted the invitation, praised the wise position of the Soviet leadership with regard to the present issues of the region, and expressed the hope that he will be able to visit the USSR at an opportune time.

TV Carries Libyan Envoy on National Day

LD011730 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 1 Sep 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today the Libyan people are celebrating their National Day, the Great Revolution Day. Taking part in our program is Muhammad Husni Sha'ban secretary of the People's Committee of the People's Bureau of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah in the Soviet Union:

[Begin Sha'ban recording in Arabic with superimposed Russian translation] Dear Friends, in spite of the short time which has passed since the day of the revolution, this path has been marked out by great deeds and achievements. But at the same time it was full of great difficulties, both on the path of internal construction and the achievement of the revolution's aims, and in the

matter of the struggle against the imperialist and reactionary forces which aspired to put an end to the revolution and turn back the wheel of history.

From the very first days the 1 September Revolution came up against the imperialist challenge, namely the United States and British military bases, the heavy inheritance of the overthrown monarchical regime. Having won the victory in the struggle for the liberation of the country from foreign bases, our people found themselves up against a whole series of imperialist and reactionary plots aimed at eliminating the revolution and undermining the efforts to strenghen Arab unity in the defense of the just cause of the Arab nation, the liberation of occupied lands. Therefore it is not surprising that attacks against Libya have been stepped up particularly in the past few years when our country has been playing a notable role in thwarting the anti-Arab plot of imperialism, Zionism and reaction against the Palestinian movement.

In the past few years the imperialists and their henchmen have undertaken various actions aimed against the Libyan Arab people, beginning with the campaign propagating false inventions and attempts at an economic blockade, right up to the U.S. armed aggression in the Gulf of Sidra and against the towns of Tripoli and Banghazi last year, and finally the aggression undertaken recently by the imperialists and their agents against the Jamahiriyah on its southern borders.

But our people, thanks to their steadfastness and revolutionary leadership, have withstood these tests with honor. The victory will be ours. In spite of these difficulties, our people will never end their struggle for the construction and development of their country. The Jamahiriyah will continue its foreign policy aimed at defending the cause of the Arab and African peoples, at international cooperation in the spirit of the principles of the Nonaligned Movement, at supporting the peoples in their struggle for freedom and independence.

Dear friends, the Libyan Arab people and their revolutionary leadership puts a high value on the strong relations existing between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah and the Soviet Union. These relations are growing stronger and are developing thanks to the great care of the leaders of both countries and the direct contact between the leader of the revolution, Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, and Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev. Our people are following and highly esteeming your program for the development and restructuring of the country, and the efforts and initiatives of the USSR aimed at achieving peace, ending the arms race and saving humanity from the dangers of war and destruction.

Thank you for your attention. [end recording]

Sub-Saharan Africa

Report on Guinea-Bissau Delegation Visit

PM011217 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Aug 87 Morning Edition p 4

["On the Stay in the USSR of a Delegation of the National People's Assembly of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau" — IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text]A delegation of the National People's Assembly of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau headed by M. Mendes Correia, first deputy president of the assembly and candidate member of the African Independence Party of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde [PAIGC] Central Committee Politburo, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union 22 through 26 August 1987 at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The delegation comprised Suzana Anibal Pereira, Malam Sambo, and Sabado Gomes, deputies of the National People's Assembly, and Pedro Gomes Pereira, secretary general of the Assembly.

The delegation laid wreaths at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior by the Kremlin wall.

In addition to Moscow, the Guinean guests visited the Moldavian SSR, where they familiarized themselves with the activities of organs of state power locally under conditions of restructuring and visited industrial and agricultural enterprises.

The delegation was received by P.N. Demichev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Meetings and talks were held with the chairmen of the chambers and the chairmen and members of standing commissions of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

During the talks information on the activities of the two countries' parliaments was exchanged in a friendly atmosphere, and urgent problems of the contemporary international situation and the state of bilateral relations were discussed.

The Guinean delegation was briefed on how the Soviet people are implementing the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee January and June (1987) Plenums and on the decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet June session on radically restructuring economic management and deepening the democratization of the country's social life.

For their part the Guinean parliamentarians spoke about the activity of the National People's Assembly in resolving the tasks of developing Guinea-Bissau within the framework of fulfilling the Fourth PAIGC Congress decisions.

The closeness of the two countries' positions was noted during an exchange of opinions on international problems. The sides voiced concern at the continuing arms

race and the plans of aggressive imperialist circles to spread it into space. In this connection the important role which parliamentarians of all states, regardless of size and socioeconomic system, are called upon to play in the struggle to end the raceit was noted.

The Guinean delegation's attention was drawn to the large-scale Soviet foreign policy initiatives whose implementation would deliver mankind from the threat of nuclear destruction and lead to the radical improvement of the international situation. The delegation members highly rated these constructive Soviet peace initiatives.

The parliamentarians of the USSR and Guinea-Bissau believe that the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world would promote international peace and stability. They advocated the need to take active practical steps with a view to implementing the idea of proclaiming Africa a nuclear-free zone.

Noting the close link between disarmament and development, the Soviet and Guinean parliamentarians attach great significance to a UN international conference on this question which could formulate effective mechanisms for switching to purposes of development part of the funds released in the disarmament process. In this connection the sides emphasized the need for all states to participate in the search for solutions promoting disarmament.

Voicing serious concern at the existence of hotbeds of tension in various parts of the world, the two countries' parliamentarians advocated a collective search for ways to unblock conflict situations, including in the Near East, the Persian Gulf zone, and southern Africa.

The Soviet and Guinean parliamentarians emphasized that the settlement of the conflict in the south of the continent in the interests of Africa and the whole world lies in the speediest removal of the inhuman apartheid system in the RSA and the ending of the Pretoria regime's occupation of Namibia and of its policy of destabilization and aggression toward the "Frontline" States.

The increasing constructive role of African states and the OAU in international affairs and in the struggle for peace and social and economic progress was emphasized. The Soviet parliamentarians noted the contribution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau to turning the OAU into an efficient tool of this struggle.

During a discussion of the state of bilateral relations between the USSR and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau it was noted with satisfaction that Soviet-Guinean ties are of a stable nature and have good prospects.

The Soviet and Guinean parliamentarians agreed to continue developing ties along parliamentary lines, regarding them as an important and stable element of Soviet-Guinean cooperation.

East Europe

Savinkin-Led Group Visits PPR

PM011307 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Interparty Ties"]

[Text] In accordance with the plan for ties between the CPSU and the PZPR, a delegation of CPSU party workers headed by N.I. Savinkin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chief of the CPSU Central Committee Administrative Organs Department, visited Poland 25 through 29 August, where it familiarized itself with the experience of party leadership of administrative organs' activity.

The delegation was received by J. Baryla, member of the Politburo and secretary of the PZPR Central Committee; C. Kiszczak, member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo and Polish minister of internal affairs; and S. Ciosek, secretary of the PZPR Central Committee.

Mueckenberger Visits Electronics Center

AU311924 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 29-3O Aug 87 p 2

[Text] Moscow (ADN) — On Friday [28 August] the delegation led by Erich Mueckenberger, member of the Politburo and chairman of the Central Party Control Commission of the SED Central Committee, visited the microelectronics center in Zelenograd near Moscow.

There it acquainted itself with the progress and projects of the USSR in this decisive sector of science and technology. In doing so, both sides stressed the significance of the close cooperation between the GDR and the Soviet Union. There was a vivid exchange of views and experiences on problems related to party work in mastering scientific-technical progress.

Birthday Greetings to Honecker

PM261333 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Aug 87 Second Edition p 1

[Soviet party, state 75th birthday greetings to GDR's Honecker]

[Text] To Comrade Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council

Dear Comrade Erich Honecker!

The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium send you sincere congratulations and best wishes on your noteworthy jubilee.

You were among those who struggled selflessly against the brown plague of fascism and, from the wreckage of Hitler's Reich, created the first socialist state on German soil. Your entire life has been devoted to the service of the working class cause, the struggle for the bright ideals of peace and social progress, and the strengthening and prosperity of the GDR.

During the years of its existence the GDR has scored great successes in building a socialist society, entered the international arena, and earned universal recognition and respect. Your contribution to strengthening the unity and cohesion of the socialist community is considerable and you are a prominent figure in the international communist movement. Your actions and initiatives in support of the policy of detente, disarmament, and mutual understanding among the peoples meet with a positive response and recognition.

Soviet people are aware of your kind feelings toward our party, the Land of the Soviets, and its people and appreciate them highly. The fact that relations between the CPSU and the SED and between the USSR and the GDR have entered a new stage of even closer comprehensive collaboration and that the scale of our cooperation has grown are also to your great credit.

We wish you, dear Comrade Erich Honecker, good health and new successes in your work for the sake of socialism and peace, the good of the fraternal people of the GDR, and the further consolidation of the indestructible friendship between our parties and states.

CPSU Central Committee

USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

Collection of Tito Speeches Published
PM231641 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Aug 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Anthology of Articles and Speeches"]

[Text] A one-volume collection of "Selected Articles and Speeches" [Izbrannyye Stati i Rechi] of Josip Broz Tito has been published. It includes works covering the period from 1941 through 1979. They show the international significance of V.I. Lenin's teaching and the Great October Socialist Revolution and their influence on the development of the revolutionary process in Yugoslavia. Great attention is devoted to questions of foreign policy and to the strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and the SFRY and between the CPSU and the LCY.

The published materials permit more profound familiarization with the experience of socialist building in Yugoslavia.

The book has been published by the Political Literature Publishing House.

West Europe

Mathias Rust Trial Opens in Moscow 2 Sep

TASS Preview
LD011356 Moscow TASS in English 1328 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS — It is calm today on the third floor of the building of the USSR Supreme Court on Vorovskiy Street, 15. The courtroom is only preparing for tomorrow's trial in the case of 19-year-old citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany, amateur pilot Mathias Rust, who faces three charges simultaneously.

On May 28 this year, a sports aircraft Cessna appeared in the sky of the USSR capital at a low altitude in violation of all rules. After circling over the Red Square, it landed nearby. By deciding on such action, the pilot endangered not only his own life but the life of many other people.

There have been more than enough versions explaining Mathias Rust's adventure which might have unpredictable consequences: from unrequited love to alleged "peace mission" caused by discontent with the result of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik. But the authors of all versions, even most noble ones, forget about the main thing — these are mere words. A man is judged by his deeds. What were the motives of Mathias Rust when he embarked on his flight over Soviet territory will become clear only at the trial.

The heart of the matter is that the FRG citizen is charged with committing criminal offense, to be more precise, several offenses. An indictment has been made against him of violating Article 81 of the criminal code of the Estonian SSR. In common with Article 83 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation it says that unlawful departure abroad and unlawful entry in the USSR without the established passport or permit of the authorities concerned is punished with deprivation of freedom for a term of from one to three years.

The second indictment under article 84 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation deals with violations of the rules of international flights. The punishment is deprivation of freedom for a term from one to ten years, or a fine of up to 1,000 roubles, with the confiscation of the air ship or without that.

Article 206 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation, (Rust is charged under its second part) provides for sanctions for offense determined as hooliganism. That part of the article says that malicious hooliganism or actions notable in their contents for special insolence are punished with deprivation of freedom for a term of from one to five years.

At ten o'clock in the morning tomorrow the examination of the case will be started by the judicial collegium for criminal cases of the USSR Supreme Court under the chairmanship of Robert Tikhomirov, member of the USSR Supreme Court. The energetic judge is 59 years old. He is a man of vast experience, a certificated lawyer and the whole of his life worked at justice bodies. Sitting on both sides of him tomorrow will be people's assessors of the USSR Supreme Court, who were elected for that important job, in common with the chairman in 1984.

Together with the chairman the trial will be conducted by Vasiliy Kuznetsov, master of the production amalgamation ZIL and Juta Kletenberg, production engineer of one of the industrial plants of Tallinn. All the three of

them have equal rights. In common with the other participants in the trial they will ensure objectivity of the examination in court. Not only inhabitants in Moscow but also representatives of Soviet and foreign mass media will come to hear the case of Mathias Rust. Twenty-five foreign correspondents, including ten West German ones, have come to Moscow to cover the trial. The FRG citizen is defended by Vsevolod Yakovlev, an experienced specialist with a good command of German language, member of the Moscow city bar of lawyers, who has well prepared for the trial.

The public prosecutor for the state in the trial is Senior Deputy Procurator General of the USSR Vladimir Andreyev. The navigation expert examination was done by Anatoliy Brylov, who is on the staff of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation. The defendant will use the services of skilled interpreters.

Thus only a day has left before the opening of the trial of Mathias Rust. Over that time the readers, who show interest in his destiny, will have to master up patience.

TV Film Planned

LD011323 Hamburg DPA in German 1206 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Moscow (DPA) — There will be no immediate television pictures world-wide of the trial of 19-year-old Kremlin pilot Mathias Rust. It was learned today from the ARD studio in Moscow that Soviet television will put together a film on the trial lasting around 60 minutes. However, it will be circulated on Saturday at the earliest, which is the day after the trial. Photographers will be allowed in every day for only 5 minutes before the start of proceedings, in addition to 25 Western journalists.

The Soviet television film on the trial is said to contain, among other things, a 20-minute interview with Mathias Rust, as well as shots of meetings with his parents and younger brother, and pictures of the plane. Rust is accused of violating the Soviet state border, the contravention of international flying rules, and aggravated rowdyism by his landing in Red Square in Moscow on 28 May.

Proceedings Begin

LD020731 Moscow TASS in English 0724 GMT 02 Sep 87

[Text] Moscow September 2 TASS — The penal division of the USSR Supreme Court, chaired by Robert Tikhomirnov, started proceedings against West German citizen Mathias Rust, 19, here today.

He is accused of unlawful entry into the USSR, violation of international flight rules and malicious hooliganism.

The case is examined in an open session.

In violation of all rules, a Cessna sports plane flew above Soviet territory at extremely low altitude on May 28, this year.

On flying to Moscow, it circled above Red Square and landed nearby. Making up his mind to carry out this action, the pilot recklessly jeopardized not only his own life but also the life of other people.

Quite a lot of versions have been put forward to explain Rust's adventure that was unpredictable in its possible consequences. The court is to determine the true causes and motivations that impelled the defendant to commit such a thoughtless act that endangered Soviet citizens.

The West German is defended by an experienced lawyer with a good command of the German language. Vsevolod Yakovlev is a member of the Moscow city bar.

Vladimir Andreyev, senior assistant to the USSR Prosecutor-General, is the state prosecutor.

A navigation examination was conducted by Anatoliy Brylov, an employee of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation.

The defendant is provided with skilled interpreters.

Some Correspondents Barred

LD020752 Hamburg DPA in German 0626 GMT 2 Sep 87

[Excerpts] Moscow (DPA) — This morning the trial of the amateur pilot Mathias Rust, aged 19, from Wedel near Hamburg began before the Soviet Supreme Court. [passage omitted]

Some Western correspondents were not allowed into the court room. The reason given was that the room was full and that they were late. About 1 hour before the start of proceedings there were around 100 journalists and some Western television teams in front of the court building in Vorovskiy Street.

Reporter Cites 'Provocation'

LD020816 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 2 Sep 87

[Text] The trial of FRG citizen Rust, who at the end of May violated the air borders of the Soviet Union, began in Moscow today. Here is what our correspondent Oleg Blinov reported by telephone from the court building:

[Blinov] The trial is a public one. Apart from representatives of the Soviet press, correspondents from the socialist countries and journalists representing the leading Western information media are also present. There are many who seek admittance to the scandalous case, especially those who are hungry for noisy sensations, but the courtroom cannot accommodate everybody. In the dock is Mathias Rust. He is charged with illegal entry into the Soviet Union, violation of the rules for international flights, and malicious hooliganism, for he made his landing right in the center of Moscow, in a busy place crowded with people, putting many people's lives at risk. Rust's explanation for his action is a desire to find

understanding between East and West, ornamenting this with words about some peace mission. But one can hardly consider violation of the state border as the correct way to express peaceful aspirations. What is more, it does not take any gift of second sight to imagine the reaction of Western propaganda had Rust's flight been cut short by extreme measures.

Today this would be playing into the hand of those who strive to employ any grounds to complicate the world situation. The court has yet to determine the essence of this provocation, and whether or not he was aware of what he was doing. But it is clear enough that Rust's adventuristic escapade and his desire to win cheap popularity at the expense of others was fraught with catastrophic consequences.

During the trial, Mathias Rust is being supplied with qualified translators of German. Right from the start, his case has been handled by Vsevolod Yakovlev, member of the Moscow City Collegium of Barristers. He is an experienced specialist, who has worked in the collegium for over 20 years and has frequently won not guilty verdicts or an alteration to [word indistinct] in trials, both criminal and civil. Apart from this, he knows German, which undoubtedly makes his work as defense counsel easier.

Rust Pleads Guilty

LD020841 Hamburg DPA in German 0800 GMT 2 Sep 87

[Excerpt] Moscow (DPA) — The 19-year-old amateur pilot Mathias Rust from Wedel near Hamburg today pleaded guilty to all three charges at the start of his trial before the Soviet Supreme Court. "My guilt is clear to me," he said. After the 30 minute reading of the charges he stated: "I now understand that the flight could have ended in tragedy." On the aim of his flight he declared that he had wanted to discuss peace and disarmament with the USSR leaders. [passage omitted]

Political & Social

Gorbachev May 1986 Speech Summarized

18070395 Moscow VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA INOSTRANNYKH DEL SSSR in Russian No 1, 5 Aug 87 (signed to press 28 Jul 87) pp 4-6

[Report on "Basic theses" of speech by M.S. Gorbachev at USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 May 1986: "Time for Restructuring"; first three paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] *"At the present time the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is being restructured, and the structure of its central apparatus and foreign institutions is being reorganized. The managerial makeup is being renewed. This line must be carried out consistently, by increasing the effectiveness of the activities of the diplomatic services and striving for a situation in which they completely conform to the energetic international activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state'*[italics as published]

(M. S. Gorbachev, "Restructuring and the Party's Cadre Policy." Report at the 27 January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee).

On 23 May 1986 M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, gave at speech to a group of workers of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We are publishing below the basic theses made in his speech, which was devoted to the restructuring of the Soviet diplomatic service.[boldface as published]

M.S. Gorbachev assigned a fundamental task to Soviet diplomats — the modernization of all their work, the sharp increase in the quality of that work, and the improvement of its creative content, style, and methods.

He pointed out the persistent need for the workers on the foreign-policy front, including the workers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to live the same life as the rest of the country, and for the activities of our diplomats to be closely coordinated with the interests of the Soviet state. Soviet diplomacy, M. S. Gorbachev stated, must help the country's domestic development. It task is to guarantee peace, without which everything else would lose its meaning. But it has also been called upon to create the best possible foreign conditions for accelerating the socioeconomic development of Soviet society. It would be a major political error if any ambassador or any other worker on the foreign-policy front felt that the matter of social acceleration does not pertain to him, that it is work for others to do. No, it is a job for all of us. Diplomats are obliged to promote that world development with which we can assist the changing of the entire system of international relations and can participate more actively in the international division of labor.

M.S. Gorbachev simultaneously emphasized that the link between foreign and domestic policy is two-sided. The difficulties that our country has undergone during a number of years in the economic area could not fail to have an effect also upon its foreign-policy position. Our opponent has made an attempt to impede our socioeconomic development. That is one of the reasons why detente in its time was replaced by a new wave in the Cold War. Now, when one can note a change for the better in our domestic affairs, there has also been a certain improvement in the international situation.

It is necessary to remember the conclusion that was made by the 27th Congress: without the acceleration of the country's economic and social development it is impossible to hold onto our positions on the international scene. The key to success in foreign-policy matters lies in the reliability and the steadfastness of our rear areas, in the health of Soviet society and our economy.

M.S. Gorbachev indicated that a vitally important task of the foreign-policy service is to aid the implementation of the strategic goals that were elaborated by the 27th Congress. The congress provided the answer to the question of what has to be done. Now it is necessary to take more rapid steps to translate its decisions and principles into the language of concrete foreign-policy actions.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee mentioned the exceptional importance of the fact that the new way of thinking must begin to dominate in diplomacy also, and that diplomacy must keep in step with the times and must take energetic steps to get rid of the stereotypes and cliches of the past. The restructuring that is currently in progress in our entire country also pertains in the most direct manner to diplomats. Creative intensity, concreteness, and businesslike efficiency are required of each of them.

The CPSU Central Committee will monitor strictly the manner in which the restructuring is occurring in the foreign-policy service. Under conditions when the West does not balk at any means of disrupting our peace offensive, we must have truly dynamic, effective, combative diplomacy.

M.S. Gorbachev required the modernizing of the forms and content of diplomatic work, the turning of diplomacy face to face with the realities of the current world, the impregnating of the professional activity of diplomacy with party decisions, and the putting of the foreign-policy service into complete conformity with the requirements of the April 1985 Plenum of the Central Committee and the 27th CPSU Congress.

The speech by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee provided a profound analysis of world development and the basic trends in the foreign-policy activity of the Soviet state.

Re-emphasis was made of the priority place that questions of the relations with the socialist countries occupy in Soviet foreign policy. Attention was also directed to the need to build those relations on the basis of respect for their experience and dignity, the understanding of the

national specifics, and trust in the search for national paths of development. In order to guarantee the new quality of the relations with the socialist countries, it is important to overcome the prejudice, complacency, and stagnation that continue to exist in the consciousness of several of our representatives. It should not be felt that we can teach all of them. No one has given us that right. On the contrary, as the most powerful country in the socialist community, we must demonstrate modesty.

Contacts with the socialist countries must be concrete and informal. It has proven possible to achieve this at the summit level, and we must also strive to achieve it on other levels. It is necessary to involve our allies in a real manner in our common affairs—even if we are talking about the smallest countries—and to engage in preliminary coordination with them concerning the essence of foreign-policy actions and to distribute the efforts of the fraternal countries in the foreign-policy sphere.

Mention was made of the importance of Soviet-Chinese relations, which, by virtue of understandable reasons, have been exerting greater and greater influence on the situation in the world. The task lies in promoting their development and thus the reinforcement of the peace.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee mentioned the exceptional importance of the consistent, skillful, and patient work to implement the decisions of the 27th Congress concerning the creation of the principles of an all-encompassing system of international security, and the implementation of our 15 January 1986 proposals. The struggle will be a difficult one in this regard. The militaristic circles will not volunteer to stop the arms race.

It is necessary to keep a careful watch to assure that our fundamental proposals that are aimed at disarmament and the limitation of the arms race are reinforced within the shortest possible periods of time by concrete recommendations at the appropriate negotiations. In this area also we must not allow a gap to develop between word and deed.

M.S. Gorbachev posed new tasks in the work in the European sector, which is one of the most important ones in Soviet foreign policy. He pointed out the shortcomings that occurred in that work in the past. He emphasized the need to overcome the inertia in thought processes. When we speak of Europe, we apply there the thesis that the Soviet Union does not look at it through the prism of its relations with the United States. But this in no way means the underevaluation of the role played by the United States.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee stated that we have shifted from dogmatic positions with respect to the EEC and it is necessary now to implement our new fundamental approach to that organization in practical matters.

M.S. Gorbachev dwelt in detail on the importance of thorough preparation for the Vienna meeting. We have a good base for that purpose. At the forum itself it is necessary for us to demonstrate boldness.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee formulated the tasks in the work to be done in the Asian and Pacific Ocean sector, which was defined at the 27th Congress as one of the chief sectors in Soviet foreign policy. He pointed out the importance of developing relations with such key countries as China, Japan, the countries of Indochina, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand, and simultaneously emphasized that our approach to the problems of the Asian and Pacific Ocean region must in no way be exhausted simply by the total sum of political and economic ties with various countries. We need long-lasting initiatives that are aimed at improving the entire situation in that region, at consolidating the security there, at limiting the arms race, and establishing broad, mutually advantageous cooperation. Here too much depends upon the active participation of the workers in the foreign-policy service.

M.S. Gorbachev devoted a large amount of attention to questions of the foreign-economic policy of the Soviet Union. Fundamental reforms must be carried out in this area.

The time has also come to consider as a comprehensive whole our economic pledges with respect to the Third World.

It is also necessary to analyze with the maximum amount of care the real economic development of the nonsocialist part of the world, not to be limited simply to asserting the existence of problems and crises there, but to take active steps to seek new opportunities for our entry into the world economy, and to make the appropriate recommendations. The chief factor is to reveal the objective tendencies and to learn how to foresee events. It is exceptionally important to overcome the lack of departmental coordination, and to establish smoothly operating interaction among all our representations abroad with regard to economic questions.

M.S. Gorbachev remarked that the approach to questions in the humanities requires fundamental reinterpretation. When some of our diplomats here the very words "human rights," a reflex action of "playing dead" sometimes goes into effect. Individual ambassadors even ask for instructions about how they should operate. They behave as though our revolution had not granted a person any real rights, as though the protection of a person's rights is not the basic function of the socialist state.

We can and must discuss this topic freely with the West, inasmuch as what is being done in our country in the area of guaranteeing human rights is truly impressive. This is not propaganda, but the objective reality. Incidentally, this is acknowledged even by the U.S. political experts.

M.S. Gorbachev sharply raised the question of a fundamental increase in the return derived from the entire

arsenal of forms and means being used by Soviet diplomacy. He oriented the diplomatic service on working for the long term, on the basis of scientifically substantiated analyses and evaluations, creating backlogs for the future. It is necessary to pay more attention to the forecasting of events, to the locating of reserves for our foreign-policy activity, and to the defining of ways to intensify the dynamism of Soviet foreign policy.

It is necessary to take a more realistic approach to international affairs. When planning foreign policy, it is necessary to make a more sober and broader evaluation of the specific facts, rather than viewing everything only from the point of view of one's own interests. Because if every country pursues only its own interests and is incapable of meeting its partner halfway, of seeking points of contact, and of cooperating with that partner, then it will be difficult to achieve any improvement in international relations.

One of the decisive forms of diplomacy is the conducting of negotiations. When conducting them, it is necessary for us to be well aware of what we want, in order not to create any impasses either for ourselves or for the other side. It is inadmissible to think that our partner is more stupid than we are. We must not allow persistence in defending a particular position to develop into senseless stubbornness, so that the Soviet representatives will be called "Mister Nyet."

M.S. Gorbachev emphasized that a factor of exceptionally great importance is a realistic party cadre policy, which includes a fight against the miscalculations and violations that have occurred, and the reliable selection and assignment of cadres at all levels. It is necessary to resolve the entire series of questions pertaining to the official activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Soviet embassies under the conditions of openness, while taking a sober, conscious approach to the evaluation of the capabilities of every worker, his knowledge, and his competency.

It is necessary to wage a persistent struggle against the penetration of petty-bourgeois phenomena into the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its representations abroad. Unfortunately, such negative situations have been occurring in the ministry. It is necessary to put an end to any attempts to hush them up, and to operate in accordance with the principle of "not washing our dirty linen in public." Otherwise the situation will not improve.

In general it is necessary to increase the spirit of exactingness among all the workers in the diplomatic service. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must not be beyond criticism and supervision. Among diplomats there must be no room for overestimating their efforts, for self-sufficiency and complacency. What we need is a healthy, critical frame of mind.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee posed the task of the further improvement of the quality of the information that is sent out by the Soviet embassies. We do not need information that does not enrich us, that does not arm us with new knowledge and ideas, that does not help us to make the correct decisions.

M.S. Gorbachev emphasized that the demands being made by the CPSU Central Committee with regard to the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet embassies will increase steadily as the scope of the tasks that are confronting our country continue to grow. Our diplomats must operate skillfully and confidently, since they are backed up by their powerful socialist Motherland.

Shevardnadze: Foreign Ministry Restructuring
18070396 Moscow VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA INOSTRANNYKH DEL SSSR in Russian No 1, 5 Aug 87 (signed to press 28 Jul 87) pp 17-22

["Abbreviated Text" of Speech: "Report by E. A. Shevardnadze at a Conference at USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 May 1987: The Rate of Restructuring in USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Light of the Tasks Advanced by M.S. Gorbachev at the Ministry-Wide Conference in May 1986 and the Results of the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] My dear comrades!

Please do not view this session as a summational one. Restructuring over a broad front began at USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs a year ago, after M.S. Gorbachev's keynote statement at the ministry-wide conference, but that restructuring will not end today or tomorrow.

The Central Committee is keeping an attentive eye on its rate and content. In the report of the General Secretary at the CPSU Central Committee January 1987 Plenum, special mention was made of the cadres in the diplomatic corps, and about the fact that the restructuring is under way in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the structure of its central apparatus and the foreign institutions is being reorganized, and the managerial makeup is being renewed.

The plenum's goal in this regard is clear and unambiguous: "This line must be carried out consistently, by increasing the effectiveness of the activities of the diplomatic services so that it will completely correspond to the energetic international activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state."

That is our serious task.

But how are we resolving it?

Much has been done, but it will be necessary to do so much more that the results that have been achieved as of today should be viewed as extremely modest ones.

Many of our comrades, when giving dynamic lectures in party organizations, state that among the questions that are assigned to them, the one that arises most frequently is that of the nature and content of the restructuring in the work of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Now it is our time. A couple of years ago we were asked about the state of affairs on the Zelenyy Mys Islands and in Beagle Channel, but not about what was occurring in our department.

Today the Communist Party members and the workers of our country want to know who is conducting the foreign-policy course of the party and the Soviet state, how they are conducting it, and how competently.

They want to be convinced that the ministry that directly represents their country and their nation to the rest of the world is carrying out changes that are adequate to the height and frame of mind of the overall restructuring of the life of Soviet society.

Yes, our foreign policy in its specific manifestations has currently become the object of critical and exacting attention on the part of Soviet citizens. Our diplomatic actions are subject to strict approval by the nation. This is a healthy and necessary phenomenon, which does not make our work easier, but which helps to make our foreign policy more effective, more aggressive, more purposeful.

As you can see, the restructuring, in addition to having professional parameters, also has broad sociopolitical dimensions for us.

How has it been proceeding with us? How is it supposed to proceed? We shall give the answers to these questions.

It is no simple matter to do this. Of course, one could mention the structural reorganization, the creation of new key subdivisions, the change in the nature of the work performed by the leading ministerial institutions, the providing of strong cadres to reinforce the leadership of the departments and administrations, the arising of a number of new trends, and the elimination of "unexplored areas" from the map of our diplomacy.

One could also mention the fact that progressive working criteria are being established in our everyday practice, that dialogue with our partners and opponents is currently constructed on fundamentally new principles, and that we do not have any taboos concerning various topics or problems.

Finally, I would say that we have completely restored the scale of ethical and professional values that has been traditional for Soviet diplomacy and have begun to rid our offices of the stale air of protectionism and nepotism, money-grubbing and narrowmindedness.

What we need today is the truth — about ourselves and about our common cause.

We shall not see this entire truth if we do not define a true point of reference for our dialogue.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has always been and continues to be an agency of the Soviet authority that is to the highest degree party-oriented, ideologically pure, precisely organized, and competent. We have complete justification for being proud of our past, our affairs, our people. Soviet diplomacy, professionally speaking, has also been invariably competitive, has always worked in accordance with the highest standards. The collective and its party organization have glorious traditions. But it is precisely the respect for the high seal of approval on the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the respect for its traditions, that requires the critical interpretation of what has been achieved.

We still have a rather large number of shortcomings and areas requiring additional work, and we will get rid of them, but the chief goal of the work that has been begun consists in creating new-generation diplomatic technology and diplomatic production, which will guarantee favorable foreign-policy conditions for allowing our country to reach the goals that have been set by the party.

Therefore, rather than being satisfied with what has been achieved, we decisively reject the generally accepted form of discussing matters. Our dialogue will deal with the key issues of the January Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which did not simply transfer the ideas of the 27th party congress to the plane of practical decisions, but also — and this is the chief consideration — personified the responsibility of every individual for the exemplary execution of his decisions. As applicable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this pertains to every manager, every worker, beginning with the minister, his deputies, and ambassadors, and ending with the young people who are newly arriving on the diplomatic scene.

I am convinced that the ministry collective is ready for this dialogue.

In order to re-emphasize the discussion method that has been adopted, I would like to refer once again to the key problem for the country and society, which was formulated by the January plenum: the party's cadre policy under the restructuring conditions. Thus, by concentrating its attention on the basic link in the restructuring—cadres—the leadership of the party and the country unified the practical political resolution of the very complicated economic, social, and administrative matters in the most sensitive zone—in what we call the human factor.

The major political scale of the restructuring takes as its basic unit of measure the human individual. This criterion is all the more reliable for your work and mine, which is nationwide in its goals and also especially individual, or, so to speak, "one of a kind" in its nature, where much is determined by the personal merits, talent, and professional capabilities of the diplomat. We must not allow any impersonal actions or unmerited equalization to occur.

The restructuring in diplomatic work is primarily the fundamental awareness, to a greater depth than ever before, of the interrelationship between the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet Union. We are all obliged

to view our practical activities in two planes—from the point of view of the effect that our domestic policy has upon the international situation, and, on the other hand, the influence that our foreign policy has on the course of domestic affairs. Without an awareness of the fact that diplomacy must create for domestic restructuring a favorable foreign-policy environment and conditions, we do not have and cannot have today a qualified, competent diplomat or a competent diplomatic service.

As we carry out the restructuring, we must assimilate a new vision of the world—a world without blinkers or dogmas, without myths and prejudices—taking advantage of the strongest and most precise optics of Marxism-Leninism.

Recently two exceptionally important new factors have become part of our Marxist-Leninist understanding of the modern world.

They are, first of all, the revelation of the fundamental fact that, during the nuclear-space age, mankind is now facing the problem of its survival.

And, second, it is the awareness of the fact that the modern world is an extremely contradictory whole, but at the same time it is one that is deeply interconnected in all its parts. Consisting of a large number of fragments, it is at the same time a single whole, and is linked by the commonality of its fate.

Both these principles were developed by the 27th CPSU Congress. After becoming the very core of the new way of political thinking in international affairs, these principles formed the basis of modern socialist diplomacy. The political and professional maturity of our cadres must be evaluated in the context of how profoundly they understand this and how skillfully they translate it into the language of practical actions. Otherwise no restructuring of diplomatic work is possible.

Having proclaimed peace to be the highest value, and peaceful coexistence to be the universal principle of international relations, the 27th CPSU Congress, of course, did not disaffirm the evaluation of imperialism and its policy, the reality of the historical confrontation between the two systems, or the ideological irreconcilability between socialism and capitalism. But what has now come into the forefront in our policy is not so much the ascertaining of the divergences, as the search for points of contact in the world that actually exists. There is no other path to the salvation of mankind during the nuclear-space age.

It follows from this that you and I will be able to work out intelligence foreign-policy recommendations if we overcome within ourselves a number of stereotypes and acquire the ability to instruct ourselves and to correct ourselves. That is, the ability to instruct or, rather, train ourselves by using the experience of the past and to correct our own actions, whether previous or current ones.

A definite part of our collective intellect must be aimed not only at forecasting, but also at analyzing past experience. We have a tremendous amount of that experience. Soviet diplomacy has had brilliant achievements. They have marked the entire history of our service at all times—during the prewar period, the exceptionally complicated wartime years, and the restoration of the national economy. Historic landmarks have distinguished our activity during the years of detente—arms limitation agreements, the Helsinki Final Act, and many others.

But, understandably, there have also been actions that cannot be evaluated unambiguously.

This must also be discussed. We have not always received the results that we counted on. The political decisions are made in the specific conditions, with a definite information level. The perception of events and their analysis are influenced by realities of the time.

When viewed from a distance of years or decades, much takes on a different appearance, inasmuch as we know the consequences and possess a large volume of knowledge and somewhat different ideas and criteria. This is all completely reasonable.

But we must return to the past experience. Not in order to issue some verdict to the past, but in order to ascertain in the past those underlying regularities that must either be confirmed in today's practice or excluded from it.

The restructuring must be based on a scientific foundation: Marxist-Leninist science and the special sciences.

We apply this requirement both to scientists in the social sciences who are working to develop our foreign policy, and to the diplomats in practical life; both to our numerous doctors and candidates of sciences, and to the scientific experts who are brought in from the outside.

Today this is no longer an idle requirement, but rather an iron necessity. Immoderately aggressive practice, that outraces sluggish theory, or sluggish, flabby theory that is concerned about how to serve practical life more adroitly, have sometimes cost us dearly.

There exists a severe shortage and acute insufficiency of theory.

One can call this anything one wishes—a social, political, or state demand—but we have an acute need for a harmonious and well-developed concept of the modern world. A concept that has been inspired by the idea that socialism can and must save mankind from self-annihilation. A concept that is, completely and essentially, a Marxist-Leninist concept that presents convincing class arguments in favor of the correctness of the thesis concerning peace as the highest value, and concerning peaceful coexistence as a universal principle of international communication during the modern era.

In this theory, in our opinion, there must be no lines of demarcation between that which is proletarian and that which is universal to all mankind. That theory has been

called upon to express the unity of the interests of mankind, the commonality of its goals and ideals—survival, the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe, the saving of civilization—ideals that are championed by socialism.

This concept has been called upon to reveal the following natural regularity: it is precisely our class interests that predetermine the struggle for ideals that pertain to mankind as a whole.

We are striving for the democratization of international relations. This presupposes an open foreign policy which, when dealing with the main questions, turns to world public opinion as a whole. Moreover, this certainly does not mean the leftist forces only. Take, for example, the recent Moscow International Forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, For the Survival of Mankind." This is how we have been acting since April 1985, imbuing our policy with a respectful attitude toward other countries and nations, whether large or small, and especially small, and toward various social currents, political and ideological.

For us democratization is the humanizing of international relations. We have proclaimed the priority that the opinion of the democratic majority has over the will of two or three great powers, and that priority is actively at work in our policy. In addition, the openness that is being confirmed within the country is becoming an effective foreign-policy instrument.

I feel a strong need to emphasize the high price of creativity. Today we have a shortage of that creativity. But the ideal would be the constant creative competition among talented people.

All the innovative proposals, new approaches, and position alternatives are findings that have been made by specific people, they are their efficiency-improvement suggestions, their discoveries.

In production and in science, a person's unique contribution is recognized and noted. But we not only fail to issue any originator's certificate [Soviet patent], but we also do not mention the fact that a particular idea was proposed by Comrade So-and-so.

This is not only a professional problem, but also a moral one. If the leadership "hides" the originator, fails to mention him, or gives the credit for his achievements to the collective, if not to the leadership itself, then that has a negative result.

We knock ourselves out in the search for incentives to develop creativity, and then we do everything to depersonalize that creativity, that is, to remove all incentives for displaying it.

Why don't we establish originator's certificates and preserve intellectual property? Then we will see innovators.

In completing the topic of democratization and openness, I would like to emphasize two factors. The first is that the restructuring that is occurring among us must not be secret. There are things which, by reason of the protection of state secrecy, we cannot reveal, but we must regularly inform the public about the essence and nature of the restructuring.

And the second factor is: we must carry out intrabranch and intraministerial democratization in such a way as to eliminate the soil for all kinds of Bonapartism, the striving to trample on as many people as possible, to act arrogantly, to give the appearance of being indispensable, infallible, and close to the wielders of power in this world. There is a name for all of this—"Communist conceit"—and it is high time to revive that term.

As you can see, we have already changed over to the subjective factors in the restructuring.

Among them I would put in first place the diplomat's professional lack of tranquility, his awareness of the fact that dissatisfaction with oneself is much more productive than self-satisfaction, which in general leads a person down a blind alley. One of the great people has said that the most complicated thing is to follow the simplest truths. In my opinion, it is even more complicated to expound them. For example, it is very difficult for me, facing this audience, to speak about the ability to learn constantly. However, this must be said. Our diplomatic production is developing at very rapid rates. In order not to lag behind that development, it is necessary constantly to assimilate that which is new, and not only in politics.

Unfortunately, this is where we encounter two basic problems. Some workers have such a heavy work load that they physically do not have the time for self-education. Others make no attempt to build up their professional potential.

Asserting that fact will not change the situation. Obviously, it is necessary to work out a system of requirements that would put in an unprofitable position anyone who is living on the basis of accumulated knowledge. I would be grateful for any advice concerning ways, within the confines of the certification that we are conducting or outside those confines, to introduce the appropriate incentives—whether psychological or material.

Because a phenomenon that is linked with this problem is such a joyless one as the physical and professional burnout of the diplomats, and this pertains to our most valuable and most capable comrades.

Because we exploit them in what is simply a merciless manner, and we give them a superhuman work load. As efficient and disciplined workers, they attempt to do everything by applying all their efforts, but gradually various things go out of their lives—first books, the theater, and the movies, then relaxation, and finally their family.

How can we organize their work more intelligently in order not to burn out the health of our best workers? If one speaks honestly, we shall not achieve anything

serious in this regard if we do not increase the number of persons who are working, as the expression goes, in the highest professional category.

But what we burn out is not the person's health, but his entire life. I am constantly troubled by a certain incident that occurred during a certification. You know that this is not a formal examination. So, during this examination, it was learned that a colleague of ours who had worked modestly for several decades had extensive knowledge and profound political savvy with regard to a region of great importance to us. But the position he occupied was an unenviable, small one, and no one recognized, or could even discern, any talent in him. Talented people are also modest sometimes, and that is how his life was spent. Now he is planning to retire.

I perceive this story with heavy feelings, like a large worldly drama.

What follows from this? Obviously, one should take the advice of the poet who said that "people with talent must be helped, but people without talent will make it on their own."

But in our ministry there should be no place for people without talent, and it is time for every manager to learn how to differentiate between talent and mediocrity.

Our cadre service, jointly with the party organization, ought to think up a system of professional training and a way of identifying the talented workers.

I would not like to utter the cliche that we do not have any justification for complacency. However, "holy dissatisfaction" with oneself should not shield from us the obvious fact that the ministry collective currently is fulfilling a sharply increased volume of work, and has achieved a slight increase in its quality. In a word, there are indisputably pluses that one should talk about. But, on the whole, the restructuring in the central apparatus, and especially in the embassies, has been squeaking along, with the attempt being made—most often, unsuccessfully—to overcome inertia, obsolete approaches, and the "traditions" of formal work.

Speaking in honest party terms, we are obliged to admit that we have not yet got rid of those problems that today are hindering the growth and productivity, as well as the quality, of our work.

The entire increase in work that the ministry has achieved in the time that has passed has been the result of extensive labor. True, we have not increased our cadre complement, but for many persons, especially those at the senior level, the length of the work day and the work week has been increased.

At the present time the ministry structure has been formed and stabilized. It would seem that everything, or almost everything, is now in place. But the crux of the matter lies precisely in the fact that everything is in place, but nothing has built up the necessary rate of movement. Work with excessively large work loads and with close deadlines is the consequence of low organization of labor in the subdivisions. We are alarmed by the situation when there are no subdivisions that are working easily, quickly, and efficiently.

Our restructuring is an inseparable part of the vast revolutionary job of restructuring Soviet society as a whole, the job that was begun and is being consistently carried out by the party under the guidance of its Central Committee, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev.

What should we rely on first of all in our further restructuring? The key lies, of course, in the further improvement of cadre work or, if one expresses it in broader terms, in the greater and greater activation of the human factor in diplomatic activity.

There are, obviously, two aspects here:

— First, the establishment of order in cadre matters; the elimination of those distortions in cadre policy that were allowed to occur during past years and we continue to this day to allow; the removal of persons who entered diplomatic service for casual reasons, persons who are unworthy, who have morally besmirched themselves;

— Second, the formation and implementation of healthy principles governing cadre policy, which conform to the requirements of the party, especially the January Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and guarantee an overall rise in the work level of the Soviet diplomatic service.

Both these questions, of course, are inseparably linked with one another. I do not wish to dwell in detail on the first aspect. Without a doubt, much has been done in this regard, and it has been done not only under the eyes of our aktiv—and, yes, under the eyes of the entire collective—but also with the direct participation of the members of the board, the party committee, the subdivision managers, and the primary party organizations with the active support of the Central Committee and its departments.

There is certainly no need to repeat here the names of the leading workers in the central apparatus who should be removed from the positions that they occupy; to list the ambassadors who were recalled and removed from the position of extraordinary and plenipotentiary representatives of the Soviet Union as a result of their unworthy behavior or because of their inability to manage groups of Soviet workers abroad. All this has contributed to a situation in which the moral atmosphere of the Soviet diplomatic service has become purer.

I know that many comrades are insulted—both those who are working now, and those who used to work—and they feel that this open policy, the policy of openness, is

exerting a negative effect upon the prestige and authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I think that there is no serious logic in this raising of the question. We must carry out this course consistently. The fact that we are purifying our ranks and that our situation is becoming healthy can only benefit us with regard to our authority within the country and outside its confines. Moreover, our comrades have certainly noted that, under the guidance of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, we attempted to carry out the cadre policy without any extreme measures, without any fits and starts, without any sensationalism, but, rather, in a solid, serious manner that befits Communists and that conforms to the requirements of our party's Central Committee.

In connection with the problem of the rejuvenating of the cadre complement one cannot, of course, not fail to return again to matters of MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of International Relations] and the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In May and June of last year the board considered in a very detailed, scrupulous manner the serious shortcomings with regard to the training and retraining of the diplomatic cadres in our educational institutions. The task assigned was to restructure the educational process, to create a flexible system of training and retraining, and to guarantee its close unity with the ministry's practical needs. A special decision of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee was made with regard to the Diplomatic Academy, and comrades from the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee engaged in checking the incoming warning signals. You all know the results.

The first steps have been taken. They include organizational measures and certain improvements in the instructional process, including those achieved by improving the curricula. It has been possible to improve the student complement at the Diplomatic Academy. All things considered, the experience of creating groups for the short-term special training of cadres to be sent to managerial positions at embassies and general consulates has proven its value. The first graduation in this special group has already occurred. At the present time we know the merits and shortcomings of this system.

At MGIMO, for the first time in many years, provision has been made for the truly competitive admission of secondary-school graduates. The social selection of first-year students has improved.

When the 1986 graduates were being assigned to work at USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the chief criteria were their abilities, their rate of social participation, and their moral outlook.

Nevertheless, both MGIMO and the Diplomatic Academy are still very far from the level that we need. According to our observations, one can still see signs of the stagnant and conservative forces that have formed there over the decades.

Now I would like to discuss something that I possibly should have begun with—managers. The experience of the restructuring and its analysis at the January plenum confirmed the key role played by the informal, real leader. However much we talk about the qualitative improvement of the work, and whatever measures we think up, we will not achieve anything if the job is not headed by an intelligent, smart, modern manager.

Don't be offended, but for the time being we still have a very small number of such managers. The type of chief who predominates is either one who is immoderately arrogant, or relatively unindependent. It has become fashionable to bemoan one's loneliness when surrounded by weak workers, to complain that there is no one to work with, and to ask for reinforcements.

It is very difficult for me personally to deal with those managers who, during a certain period of time, have not been able to find or to train even a single good worker.

Evidently they have not been directing their energy to this, and have not been working properly with cadres. But I would like to mention in some way informally those who will be able to train qualified specialists for the ministry. I would also like to hold strictly accountable those who, essentially speaking, live at someone else's expense.

Having touched upon this topic, we are obliged to mention party spirit. In our country, in their statements and numerous publications, people frequently quote the well-known words of Lenin to the effect that the collective in the Soviet diplomatic service is completely and to a man a party collective. One hears these words so frequently that, all by itself, the profoundly ambiguous meaning of that principle vanishes into thin air—a principle which can be summarized only by the statement that the basic nucleus of our workers are party members.

Yet the party spirit of the Soviet diplomat, in the most modern Leninist understanding, means precisely the public—or, if you will, the loudly public—expression of one's own opinion, as opposed to the lack of publicity, which in a cowardly manner yields its positions under the pressure, so to speak, of the superior forces of opponents.

The true party spirit of the Communist diplomat cannot abide conformism, compromise, the dodging of issues, the desire to hide behind so-called collective opinion, which actually is not even authoritative, but authoritarian.

The true party spirit of the Communist diplomat is the superstrong alloy of the creative comprehension of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, an energetic civic position, and the highest professionalism. I might add that this is also persistence in the face of any attempts to exclude our country's chief foreign-policy department from the resolution of questions that pertain directly to its competency. I could cite examples of how many many very

important questions in the country were resolved without the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by bypassing it, but with the mandatory silent participation of its representatives. There were very rare instances when anyone was not afraid to spoil relations with someone else, to express his own point of view as distinct from the prevailing one.

Essentially speaking, this is the most real nonparty behavior. It is not only betrayal of the concepts of personal honor and professional dignity, but also the crudest violation of the Party Rules, which prescribe at all levels the defending of the point of view that the Communist Party member considers to be the correct one.

My dear comrades!

As I come to the end of my report, I would like to return to the topic that was mentioned at the beginning. The country has a right to know what its diplomatic service is and how it is functioning.

But it is necessary for us, the workers in that service, to know everything about our country's life, what processes are occurring in Soviet society. We must know this not out of curiosity, but as a matter of the most acute necessity, because there cannot be any effective foreign policy, there can be no professionally strong diplomacy, without the tie-in with the domestic development of our country, without its support by the nation. Comrades, we are all participants in a great crusade for the revolutionary renovation of our socialist society.

It is necessary to establish regular and informal contacts with the labor collectives and the party organizations of Moscow, and to make trips across the country more frequently. The work in this direction has already been begun by the ministry's party committee, but it must be built not on the basis of informative lectures, but rather on a well-principled party foundation, by giving it an open democratic nature.

It will be necessary for us many times in the future to undertake an analysis of the rate of our restructuring, and at every stage we shall make an evaluation of what has been done and shall plan our future steps. The most important thing, however, does not consist in analyzing the situation and planning tasks, but in assuring that they are fulfilled, that they are implemented. Perhaps this sounds banal, but it is precisely here, speaking honestly, that one finds the quintessence of our entire restructuring and renovation. We have also spoken good words in the past, have also developed rather good plans, and have made decisions that we ourselves liked. For years and even decades, nothing got off the ground. Everything kept marking time, and finally got overgrown with moss. Everyone also knows about this.

After last year's ministry-wide conference and M. S. Gorbachev's speech at that conference, much changed in this respect.

There was a change, first of all, in the atmosphere: there was an increase in party spirit, in efficiency, frankness, and honesty. Movement began in diplomatic work, in the organizing, formation, and carrying out of that work.

The most important thing for us is not to stop half-way in the restructuring and the renovation.

More complicated and more multifaceted tasks lie ahead for the Soviet diplomatic service. Our country's foreign policy, the foreign policy of socialism as a whole, is reaching new goals in the struggle for a nuclear-free, nonviolent world. That means that a new level of depth, thoroughness, and quality of work will be required of our diplomatic service.

During the year of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the restructuring of diplomatic work must move far ahead. I am convinced that the collective of Soviet diplomats, a collective that is experienced and industrious, talented and utterly devoted to our Communist Party and our Motherland, will be able to cope with this task.

It would seem that there is no need to complete this speech by giving some kind of summation of strictly formulated conclusions: they were made for each area of our work in the course of exposition.

No single report—not only the most thorough one—is capable of encompassing the entire series of problems that one encounters in life. And there is no speech that would answer all questions. As always, I am counting on your cooperation. If all of us know that we do not yet have the answers to a large number of questions, then that is all the more reason why we must act together in seeking the answers to the complicated questions. Because no one is going to bring us these answers from the outside. This is our job and only our job.

Moscow Protest Rules Published

LD011651 Moscow TASS in English 1645 GMT 1 Sep 87

["Rules of Holding Demonstrations in Moscow" — TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS — The Moscow Soviet has approved temporary rules of organising and holding assemblies, meetings, street processions, demonstrations and other activities in the Soviet capital.

In an interview to tonight's issue of the newspaper *Vechernyaya Moskva* Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet (Deputy Mayor) Anatoliy Kostenko said that permission to make available public venues to working people and their organisations to hold mass activities is issued by the chairmen of the executive committees of the relevant soviets of people's deputies in writing.

Considering that sites visited on a mass scale by Muscovites and guests of the capital are located in the central part of Moscow and also the heavy motor traffic in the

downtown area, the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet has ruled out the holding of mass-participation activities in Red Square and areas adjoining the Moscow Kremlin and also in a number of other squares in the centre of the city. Here mass-participation activities can be held on decision of bodies of state power and administration, Anatoliy Kostenko explained.

An application requesting the provision of a venue and stating the time of the intended activity is presented by officials of state and public organisations or by individual citizens in written form and must contain the following information: exact name of the body carrying out the event, the aim, form, place or routes of movement, the time of the beginning and the end of the event, and the approximate number of participants. It should also contain the commitment to observe when conducting the event the provisions of the Constitution of the USSR and the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Other legislative acts and also regulations established by the Moscow Soviet. An application is filed not less than seven days before the planned date of the event and it is to be considered, as a rule, within a period of three days.

According to the rules, "the event should be terminated on demand of representatives of the authorities in the event of a violation of the established rules of procedure, the origination of a danger to the life and health of citizens and of a disruption of the normal functioning of transport and other services of the city economy".

The rules provide also that "persons who commit offenses in the period of preparations for and the holding of meetings, assemblies, street processions, demonstrations and other activities are accountable in accordance with existing legislation", Anatoliy Kostenko said.

Red Square Demonstrations Banned

AU011732 Paris AFP in English 1724 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text]) Moscow, Sept 1 (AFP) — Public meetings and demonstrations in Red Square and other areas near the Kremlin in central Moscow are to be banned under new "temporary regulations" voted by Moscow authorities, a city official announced Tuesday.

In an interview with the daily *Vechernaya Moskva*, Moscow City Council Deputy Mayor Anatoliy Kostenko said that henceforth, permission for meetings, processions, demonstrations and other public activities would have to sought in writing at least seven days before the planned event. The reply would also be in written form.

"Considering that sites visited on a mass scale by Muscovites and guests of the capital are located in the central part of Moscow, and also the dense motor traffic in the central area, the executive committee of the Moscow Soviet has ruled out the holding of mass-participation activities in Red Square and areas adjoining the Moscow Kremlin and also in a number of other squares in the centre of the city," he said.

The move comes after mass demonstrations outside the Kremlin in July by Tatars seeking to return to their native Crimea on the Black Sea. Authorities tolerated the demonstrations by up to 600 people for several days, and agreed to set up a commission into their grievances, before forcing them to continue their protest in a suburban Moscow park. The Tatars were later sent back to their homes in Soviet Central Asia where they had been deported by Stalin in 1944 accused of collaborating with the Nazis.

BBC Report on Vilnius Protest Rejected

LD011542 Moscow TASS in English 1431 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Vilnius September 1 TASS — The Russian-language service of the British Broadcasting Corporation a few days ago aired a report that a many-thousand anti-Soviet youth demonstration had allegedly been held in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, August 24. The report left Lithuanian radio listeners surprised. No one saw anything of that kind here. The BBC report passed off a march of soccer fans habitually held after every game played by a local club, Zalgiris, as a manifestation of anti-Soviet sentiments.

It turned out that a group of Finnish tourists witnessed the march and a BBC correspondent in Helsinki was in a hurry to report their impressions. Editors did not think it odd when told by the eye witnesses that the "demonstration" had taken place Monday, August 24, the day when Zalgiris played against Torpedo, a Moscow-based soccer club, and not on Sunday, August 23. On that day a group of individuals tried to hold an anti-Soviet demonstration in the Lithuanian capital, but managed to attract hardly more than 250 to 300 people, including passers-by who were there by accident.

In fairness to BBC let us say that it noticed the discrepancy in dates but explained it away by a possible mistake of the Finnish tourists. It was also reported that the youths had waving national white-and-green flags, although BBC surely might have found out that these were the traditional colors of the popular soccer club. And the word which the "demonstrators" were chanting, when checked, proved to be the club's name "Zal-gi-ris".

On August 23 when the organizers of the anti-Soviet action gathered near the monument to Adam Mickiewicz thousands of young people passed by, hurrying to another football match — that between the reserve makeups of Zalgiris and Torpedo.

Perhaps BBC was unhappy that they preferred a soccer match to an extremist action. However, these are the facts.

Preventative Measures for Aids Instituted

LD291243 Moscow TASS in English 1214 GMT 29 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 29 TASS — The recent decree by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on measures to prevent the spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome is meant as a barrier to the deadly disease, the Soviet doctor heading the country's central AIDS prevention laboratory told TASS.

"We are abiding by one of medicine's principal tenets which calls for doing the maximum for those who have, willy-nilly, fallen victim to a disease," said Dr. Vladimir Sergeyev (Medicine).

"Mandatory AIDS testing, first of all for those in the high-risk group, will make it possible to detect the disease and begin treatment at an earlier stage.

"Although there is yet no effective cure, we will be able to alleviate the patient's suffering to the maximum and slow down the progress of the disease," he said.

"Early diagnosis is important also because the AIDS virus is perfidious and doesn't make itself felt for a long time. Carriers are, in the meantime, potentially dangerous for those around them.

"People are not ideal, many are far from thinking about their responsibility to others. This is why the issue has been raised of compulsory measures and of criminal liability for those knowingly exposing others to the risk of contracting aids," Sergiyev said.

"In the USSR we have a government program for fighting AIDS. It provides for setting up a far-flung network of immunological test labs, including 100 this year and another 300 later. Among others, there are clinics offering anonymous AIDS testing," he continued.

"Soviet-developed test kits have proved effective and their production is being stepped up.

"More than a million people across the country have been screened, with donors being the first among them, and checks on blood banks also been organized.

"Soviet scientists have synthesized a preparation for treating AIDS, which is called Azidotimidin and is currently undergoing trials. Several research centers are looking for an AIDS vaccine. An epidemiological monitoring system is being established in the country," Sergiyev said.

He added that 102 AIDS carriers had been identified in the USSR, including 80 foreigners. Four people of these people are actually sick.

"AIDS is a global danger. This is why pooling the efforts of different countries to fight it is an indispensable condition for success," the Soviet medical scientist said.

"The USSR is actively pursuing international cooperation in the field. A common program is being prepared by researchers from the countries grouped in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Soviet scientists also have joint projects with colleagues in Austria, Britain, Italy, France, West Germany and other countries," Sergiyev concluded.

Narkevich Discusses Anti-AIDS Measures

PM301227 Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Aug 87 p 4

[TRUD correspondent V. Belitskiy interview with Mikhail Ivanovich Narkevich, acting chief of the USSR Health Ministry Quarantinable Infections Main Administration, under the heading "The Law as a Barrier Against Disease" and the rubric "Our Commentary" — first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree "On Measures To Prevent Infection With the AIDS Virus" was published yesterday.

The "plague of the 20th century" is the name given to the disease caused by a special virus officially known as AIDS, or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. The number of those infected by the virus is steadily doubling every 10 months and the disease has been registered in more than 100 countries. Until an effective cure is found, once the immune system is infected with the virus it ceases to protect the person and he dies. That is why the only reliable means of fighting the disease today is prevention. The recently approved USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree is one of the most important steps in this direction in our country. *Trud* correspondent V. Belitskiy asked Mikhail Ivanovich Narkevich, acting chief of the USSR Health Ministry Quarantinable Infections Main Administration, to comment. [passage omitted]

[Narkevich] Now, with a decision taken at top government level, we can act systematically and decisively. The decree stipulates that Soviet citizens and also foreign citizens may be obliged to undergo a medical examination whose rules, established by the USSR Health Ministry, will soon be published. It is decreed that anyone who evades voluntary examination may be taken to a medical establishment with the help of the militia if necessary. If foreign citizens refuse to be checked for AIDS they may be expelled from the USSR.

Extremely important is the introduction of punishment for persons spreading the disease who know that they are infected with the virus. Now, if they infect others, they can be given a prison sentence of up to 8 years. I think these measures will serve as a serious warning by the state to everyone who jeopardizes the health of the nation by his or her lack of discipline and irresponsibility.

If we are talking about the current situation in our country, more than a million people have been examined so far. A total of 102 were found to have the AIDS virus, 80 of whom are foreigners. I must point out that as the origin of the virus is foreign, so to speak, it has come to us as a result of contacts with citizens of other countries — either abroad or here in our country. I am talking about sexual contact, of course; this is where the danger of infection lies. This fact has dictated our tactics: We will examine our own citizens who have worked for a long period of time abroad (not because they are all suspect, certainly not. You can, after all, be infected by poorly sterilized medical instruments and so forth). We will also be examining foreigners from countries with a high AIDS risk who come to us for a long period of time.

The state has, of course, been forced to take this measure as there is as yet no cure for AIDS. Various administrative measures are being taken in a number of other

countries; whether we like it or not, the law must be used as a barrier against this disease under the present circumstances.

It goes without saying, of course, that coordinated international efforts to develop special anti-AIDS programs are extremely important. A recent WHO session, in which a Soviet delegation was actively involved, adopted just such a program and defined a global strategy for this worldwide organization to combat this disease. Soviet doctors are willing to cooperate on a broad international basis to overcome this epidemic — the most threatening ever to befall mankind.

TANJUG Highlights Magazine GLASNOST

LD011232 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1000 GMT 1 Sep 87

[By Aleksandar Novacic]

[Text] Moscow, September 1 (TANJUG) — *Glasnost*, an independent magazine, has drawn the Soviet public's attention recently.

Western Journalists call *Glasnost* Editor-in-Chief Sergey Grigoryants "a former political prisoner" released from prison recently, while the Soviet press claims he was imprisoned for speculation and smuggling.

The magazine's latest 200-page triple edition is filled with "hot" topics. It writes about the destruction of the Soviet Union's archives and recently formed socio-political organisations — the Press Club, Armenian National Party, Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners in Armenia, the same committee in Georgia, Volunteer Culture fund in Moscow.

Grigoryants writes about whether "the KGB is joking or working seriously" and "secrecy in the Soviet Union." He analyses the questions of the right to emigrate from the Soviet Union and national problems in the Soviet Union with focus on the Crimean Tatars.

There is no criticism of Mikhail Gorbachev in the magazine and the course of openness and democratisation is offered verbal support.

Sergey Grigoryants talks about the magazine as the first "non-governmental, socio-political magazine in the Soviet Union in the past 70 years."

He admits he is not certain of the status of the magazine and underscores that he contacted the Soviet party Central Committee "but did not receive a direct answer."

State Committee for Publishing Vice-Chairman Mamleyev told him there were 8,500 newspapers and 1,500 magazines in the country representing state or social organisations while *Glasnost* represents no one.

Grigoryants adds that *Glasnost* is not breaking the law since there is no law on the press in the Soviet Union.

The authorities did not react to the appearance of *Glasnost* with administrative measures but *Vechernyaya Moskva* has sharply criticised it.

Vechernyaya Moskva wrote that *Glasnost* claims black is white and substitutes basic values with frail demagogy. The editor-in-chief is sharply criticised for the thesis that "Stalin is dead but his work lives on."

Vechernyaya Moskva journalists visted Grigoryants and quoted him as saying that he does not want his magazine "to be dissident but objective in nature."

A conflict arose when Grigoryants was asked why he was in prison. *Vechernyaya Moskva* published the court ruling under which he was sentenced for smuggling and not as a political prisoner.

Literary Press Editors Hold Conference

PM011631 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Sep 87 p 1

[Unattributed report under the rubric "In the USSR Writers Union": "On the Frontiers of Restructuring"]

[Text] A conference of literary press leaders was held in the USSR Writers Union on 27 August. It was emphasized at the conference that, at the present crucial stage of the country's development, the literary and artistic journals and newspapers are called upon to become one of the effective instruments of revolutionary renewal and help the party in the restructuring of all aspects of society's life. The literary periodical press makes its contribution to the solution of these tasks, influencing the awareness and culture of its millions of readers and affecting the shaping of the spiritual and moral climate. Newspapers and journals have recently carried on their pages quite a few noteworthy items on the problems of socioeconomic life, relations among nations, and historical recollection which are worrying Soviet people. It is gratifying that writers' works on current affairs occupy an important position in spiritual life, that they not only analyze and criticize the negative phenomena which apply the brakes on advancement but also help to create a new social awareness and a new style and methods of work and to develop democracy, glasnost, criticism, and self-criticism. At the same time, it was stressed at the conference that glasnost and democracy do not mean irresponsibility, total license, and anarchy.

The publication of a considerable number of works which, for various reasons, were unknown to the mass readership for years on end is a natural process testifying to the further development of democracy. Moreover, attention was drawn to the need for a considered approach toward the evaluation of different aspects of the socialist state's historical development. The main point here is the truthful, objective, and analytical evaluation of the past. At the meeting with leaders of mass news media and creative unions, M.S. Gorbachev said that we must value every one of our history's 70 years. Errors occurred along our historical path, but they were always coupled with real successes.

Describing plans for preparations for the Great October jubilee, participants in the conference noted that literary publications still carry very few works revealing the continuity of revolutionary traditions and their role in the younger generation's ideological education, there are no vivid and memorable images of our contemporaries. One conclusion could be drawn from what was said: The literary press is still only just approaching the frontiers of restructuring.

The conference was addressed by S. Baruzdin, chief editor of the journal *Druzhba Narodov*; Yu. Izyumov, first deputy chief editor of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*; N. Fedorenko, chief editor of the journal *Inostrannaya Literatura*; M. Kolosov, chief editor of *Literaturnaya Rossiya*; A. Salynskiy, chief editor of the journal *Teatr*; V. Lakshin, first deputy chief editor of the journal *Znamya*; N. Miroshnichenko, chief editor of the journal *Sovremennaya Dramaturgiya*; A. Dementyev, chief editor of the journal *Yunost*; L. Varustin, deputy chief editor of the journal *Zvezda*; and Yu. Verchenko, secretary of the USSR Writers Union Board.

The conference was addressed by V.K. Yegorov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Culture Department.

Yeltsin Opens Moscow Pedagogical Conference
LD270916 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 26 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow's Pedagogical Conference for August was held today. It was opened by Comrade Yeltsin, who focused attention on shortcomings in implementing reforms to the education service. The process of renewal has been too protracted. There is still no sign of any turn in the orientation of teachers, pupils and parents toward the capital's real needs. The free-ride mentality [izhdevencheskiye nastroyeniya] is widespread, while there is minimal participation by school-leavers in the main sectors of the city's main services.

The conference stressed that reform is a public matter, and does not apply only to pedagogical collectives, educational organizations, or communists working in schooling. All Party and local soviet economic organizations in the city are urged to concern themselves with the creation of a firm material and technical base for reform, all-round ideological support, and improved social conditions for teachers.

Ligachev, Yeltsin Attend Moscow Opera
PM301303 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Aug 87 p 1

[TASS report: "Applause for the Sverdlovsk Opera"]

[Excerpts] All the performances of the artistes of the Sverdlovsk A.V. Lunacharskiy Academic Opera and Ballet Theater, whose creative review is drawing to a close in Moscow, were sold out.

The guests from the Urals brought an extensive and varied repertoire to the capital. Over a period of 3 weeks works by Russian and foreign classical authors as well as contemporary works were performed at the K.S. Stanislavskiy and Vl.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko Theater. [passage omitted]

An opera — "The Prophet" — by V. Kobekin, a young composer from Sverdlovsk, attracted great interest. It is based on Pushkin's "The Stone Guest" and "A Feast During the Plague."

This show was attended by Ye.K. Ligachev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, and B.N. Yeltsin, CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member and Moscow CPSU Gorkom first secretary. Also present was V.G. Zakharov, USSR minister of culture.

Dobrynin, Lukyanov Attend Pioneers' Jamboree
LD312246 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1950 GMT 31 Aug 87

[Text] The Ninth All-Union Pioneers' jamboree has ended at Artek. The envoys of detachments and squads summed up the results of their pioneers' marching session — "We keep a revolutionary step" — devoted to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. CPSU Central Committee Secretaries Dobrynin and Lukyanov were present at the festival.

Dolgikh Attends Meeting Marking Miner's Day
LD290601 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 28 Aug 87

[Report over video from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] On Sunday 30 August our country will be marking Miners' Day. A festive meeting devoted to this professional holiday was held today at the Oktyabr concert hall in the capital. In the presidium were Comrade Dolgikh, the heads of a number of ministries and departments, production front-rankers, scientists, and representatives of the public of the capital. Comrade Shchadov, USSR minister of the coal industry, delivered a report.

It was noted at the meeting that a fundamental breakthrough had made itself felt in the industry. Since the start of the year, miners extracted more than 10 million metric tons of fuel above plan. The target for labor productivity was also overfulfilled. These successes, however, give no grounds for taking things easy. Many unutilized reserves still need to be brought into play.

BRIEFS

Ambassador to Luxembourg

Moscow August 28 TASS — The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has appointed Aleksandr Avdeyev the USSR's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Luxembourg. Before his current appointment, Avdeyev was chief of a sector in the first European department of the USSR Foreign Ministry. Kamo Udumyan was relieved of the duties of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Luxembourg due to transfer to another job. [Excerpts] [Moscow TASS in English 1129 GMT 28 Aug 87 LD]

Supreme Soviet Bestows Awards

For their great contribution to ensuring the transportation of goods and the water supply for the city of Moscow the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has awarded workers of enterprises and organizations of the Imeni Moskvy canal directorate orders and medals. [Excerpt] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 28 Aug 87 LD] By a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Ryazan Oblast drama theater has been awarded the Medal of Honor [znak pocheta] for services toward developing the Soviet theatrical arts and in connection with the theater's bicentennary. [Summary] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 28 Aug 87 LD]

Tajik Radio German Broadcasts

Tajik Radio has commenced broadcasts in German for Soviet Germans living in that republic. The first broadcast included news about Tajikstan and interviews with front-rankers in industrial and agricultural production who are Germans by nationality, as well as foreign news reports. The program, lasting 20 minutes, will go out twice a month. There are now Tajik Radio programs in Russian, Uzbek, Kirgiz and German. [Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 30 Aug 87 LD]

Economic

Shiryayev Interviewed on Reforms

AU011501 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 31 Aug 87 p 6

[Interview with Yuriy Shiryayev, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director of the International Institute of Economic Problems of the World Socialist System, "through *Novosti* specially for RABOTNICHESKO DELO: "The Integrated Approach in the Reforms Requires That Positive Experience Be Rapidly Spread" — date and place of interview, name of interviewer not given]

[Text] [*Rabotnichesko Delo*] Yuriy Semenovich, you have spent many years studying the experience of the socialist countries. What has been borrowed from this experience in the course of the restructuring in the Soviet Union?

[Shiryayev] Both the decisions of the July 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the decisions adopted earlier on further improving foreign economic activity were undoubtedly adopted after first taking account of the experience of the socialist countries. Naturally, this was not a direct copying, and could not be so. The Soviet Union differs from the other states of the community in the scale of its economy, in the number of its economic branches, and in several other more specific special features. For example, nowhere else is the problem of territorial planning so pressing as in the USSR. The mastering of the zones of the Baykal-Amur Main Line is a more specific example. This promises huge advantages if it is implemented according to the new principles in relation to economic efficiency and increasing the economic effect from the investments. Of course, there are no problems of this kind in the countries of the socialist community. In this connection I wish to stress that the decisions of the July 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee are completely innovative. Without a doubt, attention was paid to the experience of the socialist countries, and not only the positive experience. Certain failures in a number of experiments were also taken into account.

[*Rabotnichesko Delo*] For example?

[Shiryayev] For example, I don't think that the inflation caused by the economic reforms in a number of states can be regarded as one of the positive factors. The Soviet Union has clearly stated its intention to raise the living standard of the population and to bring the amount [masa] of goods and money into balance, that is, an anti-inflation program has been set out in black and white.

In working out the ways and methods for restructuring the national economy in the USSR, we start from the special features of the Soviet economy. It possesses gigantic potential, but the problems that have accumulated in it are great as well.

[*Rabotnichesko Delo*] Let us define more accurately the position regarding inflation. Some economists regard inflation as an incentive for economic development. Why is this unacceptable?

[Shiryayev] Such views indeed exist. They are not new, they first appeared as early as the thirties. In Poland, for example, inflation was even planned for in the precrisis period. And this is not an isolated example. Yet how will such plans stand the test of time? How will inflation be curbed, so that it does not get out of control? In principle, inflation undermines the foundations of the planned economy. How is it possible to plan if you do not know what the goods essential for production will cost in a couple of years time, or what your production costs will be? I am not referring to the social consequences of inflation.

[*Rabotnichesko Delo*] Let us now talk about the positive experience of the socialist countries that the Soviet Union is taking into consideration.

[Shiryayev] In the Soviet Union the discussions on the subject of the reforms and, in particular, on the ways to implement them, did not start just now, but long ago. We discussed the most varied alternatives; in the seventies, for example, concepts were developed on perfecting foreign economic links, on the role of profit as an indicator of economic activity, and so on.

Many of the ideas (and the USSR is indeed the country with the greatest experience in socialist construction) attracted the attention of other countries in the community and found applications there. As was stressed at the

27th CPSU Congress, phenomena of stagnation made their appearance in our country at a certain stage in society's life. Under these conditions many of the constructive ideas were not realized in practice. For example, the Shchekino experiment was an excellent idea, but the experiment failed to catch on.

[*Rabotnichesko Delo*] Why?

[Shiryayev] Because, in this particular case, only the enterprise should decide the issue of what will be done with the released manpower. And a decision ought to be sought on a national scale. There are many similar examples....

To sum up: Many ideas that appeared in the USSR and were not implemented at the proper time were borrowed by other socialist countries. In those countries these new ideas were experimentally tried out in practice. Now they are being implemented in the Soviet Union, but of course on a different scale and under different conditions.... Thus, there can be no question of a dialectical situation, of a "secondary borrowing."

It would be stupid to deny the importance of individual elements of that which has been achieved in the socialist countries, but, in its entirety, the national economic structure which has now been created in the USSR is our very own.

[*Rabotnichesko Delo*] One last question. A new economic mechanism is being formed in the Soviet Union. Clearly, this cannot fail to have an effect on the cooperation between the CEMA member countries. Are no contradictions arising between the Soviet economic mechanism and the mechanism of cooperation between the CEMA countries?

[Shiryayev] A problem does indeed exist here. In the Soviet Union a progressive economic mechanism has been created and is being introduced in practice; the parameters of this mechanism undoubtedly exceed those of the mechanism of international cooperation approved within the CEMA framework. Naturally, in the course of this reform attention must be given to the realities in the economies of all the CEMA member countries, including that of the Soviet Union, the greatest of the partners.

On numerous occasions I have had to listen to just critical remarks regarding CEMA from colleagues in the socialist countries. This criticism was somehow redirected through CEMA (as an organization) to the Soviet Union, where the economic mechanism was not flexible enough and had not adapted to a sufficient extent to active international cooperation. Now the situation has been radically changed. In the Soviet Union a mechanism already exists within whose framework all kinds of most progressive and up-to-date contacts can be implemented. All the barriers in the path of international cooperation are broken down. Accordingly, we have the situation that under these conditions the mechanism of international cooperation is proving to be a bottleneck....

[*Rabotnichesko Delo*] That is, what has been established during CEMA's almost 40-year-long existence has already fulfilled its role and exhausted its possibilities....

[Shiryayev] Undoubtedly it played a certain positive role. This cannot and should not be denied. What is more, many of the principles for organizing cooperation that have been tried and tested in real life will remain an active factor in the future for the cooperation between the socialist countries. However, this does not make the new approach of any less immediate interest.

On a bilateral basis the Soviet Union is demonstrating measures aimed at the long term: both the direct links between enterprises and the joint organization of trusts [obedineniya]. However, I repeat, this is mainly on a bilateral basis. CEMA has not yet adapted to this kind of activity, and for this reason it must be restructured.

Disposal of Firm Assets Predicted

OW010831 Tokyo KYODO in English 0823 GMT 1 Sep 87

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 1 KYODO — A leading Soviet theoretician and supporter of Kremlin leader Mikhail Gorbachev's economic reform campaign predicted Tuesday that Soviet firms shifting to the complete self-supporting accounting system under a forthcoming law on state enterprise will be free to dispose of their assets.

Addressing a lecture meeting in Tokyo, Vladimir Laptev, a professor at the State and Law Institute affiliated with the Soviet Academy of Science, said, however, that state control of production will remain unchanged even after the law takes effect in January.

But with their transition to the new accounting system that will enable them to raise funds independently, they will also be allowed to control their assets, including fund liquidity, buildings, as well as plants and equipment, he said.

Touching on how to distribute the producers' goods, the Soviet's most authoritative economic law expert said that the new law will also allow more liberalized systems.

Among them will be the creation of a wholesale market enabling both goods producing and consuming firms to conclude direct contracts, Laptev said.

The other will be the transition to a system under which the firms will be able to decide prices by themselves from the current official pricing system as far as consumer goods are concerned.

This will naturally exclude goods in short supply, he added.

Agricultural

Farms Fulfill Grain Delivery Plans

Kiev Oblast

AU311456 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 26 Aug 87 p 1

[RATAU report: "Grain to the State"]

[Excerpts] Kiev Oblast farmers have fulfilled the plan for

selling grain to the state. A total of 564,000 metric tons of grain have been delivered to reception centers, or 64,000 metric tons more than targeted.

Under the complex weather conditions the high yields, averaging 39 quintals of grain per hectare, were obtained with the assistance of the application of intensive technologies, advanced forms of labor organization and payment, and economic accountability at many farms. Compared with 1986, the per-hectare grain yields in the oblast increased by an average of 10 quintals. [passage omitted]

The oblast's kolkhozes and sovkhozes have provided themselves with seeds, and have stored significantly more fodder than last year. Machine operators are close to the completion of mowing. Buckwheat and millet gathering is in progress. At the same time farmers are preparing the fields for the 1988 crop.

While competing in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Great October, Kiev Oblast farms are continuing the sale of grain to the state.

Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast

AU311418 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 27 Aug 87 p 1

[Report by M. Fedik, PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent: "Grain for the Motherland"]

[Excerpt] Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast farms have fulfilled the plan for selling grain to the state. The deliveries to granaries have thus far totaled 110,000 metric tons, or 30,000 more tons than targeted.

In the oblast as a whole, the per-hectare yields averaged nearly 36 quintals, or 2.5 quintals more than in 1986. Even higher per-hectare yields, averaging 45 quintals, were obtained from the 67,000 hectares of land under intensive farming. [passage omitted]

Ternopol Oblast

AU311406 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 27 Aug 87 p 1

[RATAU report: "True to Their Word"]

[Excerpts] Ternopol Oblast farmers are persistently overcoming the difficulties caused by the rainy weather. They have delivered to elevators and grain reception centers 500,000 metric tons of grain, or more than planned. The tasks for delivery of valuable wheat and pea seeds to the granaries have been overfulfilled. [passage omitted]

Having provided themselves with seeds and having increased their fodder stocks, the oblast's farms are continuing to sell grain to the state in excess of the plan. In preparations for the 70th anniversary of the Great October, the farmers intend to sell about 100,000 more metric tons of grain.

Lvov Oblast

AU311404 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 27 Aug 87 p 1

[Report by Zh. Rudenko, PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent: "Lvov Oblast Loaf"]

[Excerpts] Any harvest is hard work, but gathering ripe ears of grain under unending rain is the most difficult. But good organization, properly chosen working operations, and new incentives in socialist competitions have brought Lvov Oblast farmers success. The oblast has already overfulfilled the plan for selling grain to the state, having delivered to the people's granaries 151,000 metric tons, or 21,000 metric tons more than planned. [passage omitted]

The sales of grain to the state are continuing, and seed storing is coming to an end. The farmers have paid much attention to the selection of varieties that have proved themselves.

Preparations are in progress for fall sowing.

Volyn Oblast

AU311415 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 28 Aug 87 p 1

[Report by A. Bondarchuk, PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent: "Grain in Excess of the Plan"]

[Excerpt] Volyn Oblast farmers have successfully fulfilled the plan for grain sales to the state, having delivered about 200,000 metric tons of it against the targeted 140,000 tons. The oblast's sales will total 220,000 metric tons of grain.

This is a record year both for per-hectare and overall grain yields. Record per-hectare yields of 49 quintals have been obtained by Ivanichevskiy Rayon kolkhozes. [passage omitted]

Zhitomir Oblast

AU311417 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 28 Aug 87 p 1

[Report by B. Popov, PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent: "From the Fields in the Forest Zone"]

[Excerpts] Zhitomir Oblast farmers have won a great labor victory. The oblast's kolkhozes and sovkhozes have coped with the tasks set for selling grain to the state. They have delivered to grain procurement centers 294,000 metric tons of grain against the 240,000 tons targeted.

The yields of wheat, rye, and barley obtained in the forest zone in the oblast in the current year are unprecedented. The oblast"s per-hectare yields averaged 30.1 quintals. [passage omitted]

The delivery of grain is going on. The oblast's kolkhozes and sovkhozes have fully provided themselves with seed resources for the 1988 crop.

Rovno Oblast

AU3111457 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 29 Aug 87 p 1

[Report by A. Bondarchuk, PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent: "To the Motherland's Granaries"]

[Text] Not so long ago, per-hectare grain yields of 50-55 quintals were regarded as a record in Rovno Oblast, and were only obtained at one or two farms. At present there are about 40 kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the oblast which have achieved such results.

Fields have responded generously to the farmer's solicitude. Per-hectare grain yields averaged 36 quintals. The kolkhozes of Goshchanskiy, Chervonoarmeyskiy, and Dubnovskiy Rayons obtained an average of 42-43 quintals. The oblast has successfully fulfilled the plan for selling grain to the state. A total of 193,000 tonnes of grain have been delivered to granaries, or 43,000 tonnes more than targeted. All grain deliveries will amount to at least 220,000 tonnes.

Farms in the oblast are now preparing seeds and fields for fall sowing. Some 172,000 hectares of land are ready for sowing. More and more people are going over to plowless soil tillage. Sowing equipment is ready to move to the fields.

Grain Harvest Successes Reported

PM011319 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 87 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report under the "Harvest 87" rubric: "To the Motherland's Granaries"]

[Text] Mordovia's arable farmers have scored a major success: The harvest is still in progress but they have already delivered 325,000 tonnes of grain to the procurement enterprises and have fulfilled the pledges of the jubilee year. The plan target for the sale of winter rye has been met. The planned harvest of grain — an average of 18.1 quintals per hectare — has been achieved for the first time. Many farms have milled 30 quintals and more.

Having procured their own supply of seeds and increased the stocks of feed, farms in the autonomous republic are not stopping the sale of grain to the state. In all they intend to deliver around 400,000 tonnes of grain to the motherland's granaries.

The state plan for grain sales has been fulfilled by farms in Tambov Oblast. Some 960,000 tonnes of grain have been delivered to the grain reception centers as against a plan target of 950,000 tonnes.

The harvest pacemakers are the workers of Tambovskiy Rayon, who have already fulfilled the plans for the first 2 years of the 5-year plan. They have sold the state 75,000 tonnes of choice grain. Good work has been done by Zherdevskiy, Rzhaksinskiy, and Sosnovskiy rayons, which have delivered 50,000 tonnes of grain each to the state. The oblast has met its own needs for high quality seeds in full. Sale of grain to the state is continuing.

Rural workers in Sumy Oblast have dispatched 591,000 tonnes of grain — more than the plan target — to the elevators and grain reception centers. The plan target for procurements of wheat, rye, and peas has been overfulfilled. Around 70,000 tonnes of grain have been sent by Belopolskiy Rayon, and more than 50,000 tonnes have come from Sumskiy Rayon. On average the oblast has produced almost 8 quintals of grain per hectare more than last year.

The oblast's kolkhozes and sovkhozes have satisfied their own seed requirements in full and increased feed stocks. In preparing to give a fitting greeting to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the crop farmers intend to sell the state at least 100,000 tonnes of grain more.